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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Eurocommunism: Stalinism or Social Democracy ?

by



Etienne Adant

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
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The undersigned certify that they have read,  
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Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled  
Eurocommunism: Stalinism or Social Democracy ?  
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## **Abstract**

Eurocommunism is understood as a political doctrine put forward by several European as well as non-European communist parties as a challenge to Russian socialism. This thesis analyzes how the Eurocommunist trend emerged from within the Third Communist International. The popular front experiences are analyzed thereafter in reference to the appraisal of the communist parties share of power. A stress is put on Gramsci's socialism as the spiritual origin of a new kind of communism. The actual significance of Eurocommunism in three Western European countries is analyzed in a three-step approach. First the doctrine, second the internal life, and third the positions of the parties in their national political scenes, receive attention. Finally, the foreign policy of the three parties is discussed. This thesis tries to make a small contribution to the literature of socialist political doctrines.



### List of acronyms

CGT: Confederation generale du travail, a French labour union congress controlled by the PCF.

CI: Communist International, the Third International.

Comintern: synonym for the Communist International.

Cominform: Communist Information Bureau created in 1947.

MRG: Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche, a French center-leftist party.

PCE: Partido Comunista de España, Spanish Communist Party.

PCF: Parti Communiste Francais, section française de l'Internationale Communiste up to 1943, French Communist Party.

PCI: Partito Comunista d'Italia, Partito Comunista Italiano; since 1944, Italian Communist Party.

PS: Parti Socialiste; French Socialist Party.

PSI: Partito Socialista Italiano, Italian Socialist Party.

PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero de España, Spanish Socialist Party of Workers.

SFIO: Section française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, French section of the Second International after the split of Tours (1920), and before the creation of the PS.



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## I. Introduction

What is Eurocommunism? A broad range of meanings comes out of the discussion of the concept of Eurocommunism. Eurocommunism has been considered by some as a deceptive manoeuvre or a typically conceived communist tactic. President Ford, for example, adopted this point of view. He stated that Eurocommunism masked Stalinism and disguised tyranny.<sup>1</sup> Among other Westerners who still believe that Eurocommunism is a Moscow manoeuvre, Franz Josef Strauss, chairman of the German Christian Democratic Union, bluntly asserted that communism was incompatible with freedom. He therefore refused to grant any credit to the affirmations made by Eurocommunist leaders in respect of freedom and democracy.

Moscow allows the Eurocommunists to go as far as they see fit in order to establish a popular front with the Social Democrats, that is with the Socialists among the Social Democrats. It is ludicrous to think however, that an independent Eurocommunist movement is developing in the West, for Communism and Freedom are always incompatible.<sup>2</sup>

However, many non-communist Westerners still recognize in Eurocommunism a certain autonomy from the Soviet Union. They acknowledge the will of the Western European communist parties to overcome the traditional dogmatic positions of communism, their refusal to support unconditionally Soviet foreign policy and the fact that they accept ideological, political and social pluralism. In brief, they say that communist parties are in favor of a democratic form of revolution. On many occasions, communist party leaders have indeed claimed to follow such pluralistic and autonomous paths vis-à-vis Russia and its Bolshevik model of revolution. One can say that there has been a general trend within the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the French Communist Party (PCF), and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), to keep their distance from Moscow, especially in the last thirty years. The leaders of these parties have tried to demonstrate their original and national emphasis on democracy.

The PCE, PCI and PCF leaders' efforts to present their respective party as democratic will be examined and appraised. The writer wishes first to analyze how these contentions have emerged and also to analyze the substance of these contentions, and to answer the question of whether or not they represent permanent and stable party stances. This is done in chapter two. In a second step, their actual significance will be studied.

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<sup>1</sup>Die Welt, Hamburg, May 12, 1977.

<sup>2</sup>Die Welt, Hamburg, December 16, 1976.





Chapters three and four analyze this actual significance.

In the chapter two, the popular strategy will be examined. The present PCE and PCF leaders and members generally consider that prior to World War II, the French and Spanish communist parties were autonomous from Moscow and stood for a democratic revolution. Contrary to this contention, it will be seen that the PCF and PCE had no real autonomy at that time, because they had no different theoretical basis nor sufficient internal strength and cohesion to stand autonomously from Russia. Yet, it will be seen that thereafter, at one time or another in their evolution, the Spanish and Italian communist parties overcame these difficulties. These two parties persistently developed positions different from the Soviet bolshevik model.<sup>3</sup> The PCF is considered in this thesis as never having attained such a stable autonomy.

In chapter three, the three parties will be analyzed with regard to crucial problems of communism (for example, the role of the ideology, the concept of democratic centralism), as influenced and modified by their "Eurocommunist stances". Their actual stances for a democratic revolution and its implications, as well as their internal composition and organization, will receive special consideration. Chapter four will consider their views in foreign policy matters vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the EEC, and the world implications of their Eurocommunism. Finally, the conclusion will provide a discussion on the meaning of the Eurocommunist movement. The following questions will be posed: Is there room for Eurocommunism as a communism with a human face between the dictatorial Russian and Chinese ways to Socialism and Social Democracy? And, if so, does Eurocommunism fill that space?<sup>4</sup>

The preceding questions are central to the Eurocommunist debate; because, as previously seen, some observers consider Eurocommunism as a mere tactic, others –mainly from the left of the Eurocommunist parties– contend that Eurocommunism is merely another form of social democracy. These latter contend that the Eurocommunist

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<sup>3</sup> The Soviet bolshevik model refers to the 1917 type of revolution and also to the Russian type of socialism as implemented by Lenin, Stalin, and Brezhnev. It does not include the "Khrushchevization" which, for the author, has been an attempt to diverge from Lenin's or Stalin's tradition, an attempt abandoned by Brezhnev in the name of orthodoxy.

<sup>4</sup> "Communism with a human face" is a communism which develops new positions from what we know as Russian socialism and social democracy. In other words, it is a communism that breaks the dilemma of revolutionary bolshevik communism versus liberal democratic, non-scientific, social democratic socialism (social democracy). "Communism with a human" face is used by Annie Kriegel in Eurocommunism: A New Kind of Communism (Stanford, Hoover, 1978).





parties have lost their revolutionary aim because of their acceptance of "Bourgeois Democracy".

In the second step of the research, the party stances are analyzed in two ways – the doctrine and the internal life of the party. The doctrinal analysis constitutes a look at the doctrinal positions of the participants to the Eurocommunist debate. This analysis is intended to see if what the Eurocommunist leaders say, write and live in their party gives rise to a new communism.

This study deals with the Spanish, French and Italian communist parties for two major reasons. The first is the relative strength of these parties in Europe; the second is the social and economic identity of the three countries in which Eurocommunism has developed as a political opposition force or even as a constituent of governmental majorities.

Although other communist parties in Western Europe have espoused the Eurocommunist points of view (mainly the British and the Belgian communist party), the Eurocommunist movement is a product of Southern Europe and more precisely of Spain, France and Italy.<sup>5</sup> Along with Portugal, these are the countries in which social democracy has never been represented by strong and durable grass roots parties. Their communist parties have dominated the Left for most of the twentieth century. The PCE, the PCF and the PCI have for a long time symbolized the only strong and stable opposition aiming at the defense of the "workers". The communist parties have succeeded until recently in presenting themselves as the only faithful representatives of these "workers". Socialists and radicals were presented by the communists and effectively viewed by a large majority of the working class as unable to defend the interests of this working class because they did not hesitate to share power with "le Patronat et le Grand Capital". The other parties of the Left used to be considered by the Communists and effectively viewed by the bulk of the working class as "groupuscule", leading the working class to an adventurous putsch with disastrous consequences. The domination of the Left by the communist parties is still a reality in Italy. In Spain, the prestige retained by the Communists, because of their struggle against Franco's dictatorship, faded away and the PSOE, which had played a lesser opposition role during the period of the dictatorship, beat the Communists by a

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<sup>5</sup> Note however that the Eurocommunist movement is not exclusively an European one. The Japanese communist party, for example, develops Eurocommunist points of view.



fifty-to-one proportion in the November 1982 general elections. Created in 1970, the French PS rapidly succeeded in replacing the PCF as the largest party of the Left; in fact, the PS superseded the PCF in the 12–19 March 1978 and May 1981 elections.

The Latin and Mediterranean character of Spain, France, and Italy can be used as a label implying a whole series of social and economic characteristics which Professor Kriegel, a former PCF member and a renowned specialist in Eurocommunism, enumerates:

The experience of the Enlightenment, a delayed industrialization process, a weak propensity for political and social democracy, the fascist experience (mainly for Spain and Italy), the centralization of the nation–state under challenge from virulent or chronic regionalism, and an old and authentic native and libertarian working class movement.<sup>6</sup>

Jean Elleinstein, a French communist historian, links the relative strength of the Latin communist parties studied with the fact that France, Spain and Italy are predominantly Catholic countries and argues that the Catholic condemnation of profit–making helped the development of communist parties in these countries.

Ce n'est certainement pas un hasard si les partis communistes les plus influents du monde occidental se situent dans des pays latins où le catholicisme demeura prépondérant à l'issue du seizième siècle. Dans les pays protestants, les partis communistes sont peu influents et ne jouent pas un rôle politique important. Dans les pays catholiques, les partis communistes ne sont que la version laïcisée de l'Eglise catholique, d'où la fascination qu'ils exercent sur certains milieux catholiques de gauche qui reprennent la tradition de la condamnation du profit demeurée vivace dans le catholicisme et qu'on ne trouve pas dans le protestantisme.<sup>7</sup>

Elleinstein sees a link between the fundamental criticism of profit made by the Catholic Church as opposed to Max Weber's "Protestant ethic" and the equally fundamental communist criticism of capitalism. In both communism and Catholicism, there is an acceptance of a "Church"<sup>8</sup> as a strong social organization instituting social dogmas (e.g., dictatorship of the proletariat versus divorce or abortion) and nominating qualified interpreters of these dogmas.<sup>9</sup>

From the literature, two main analyses of Eurocommunism can be distinguished: a political philosophy analysis and a party politics approach. The political philosophy literature questions Eurocommunism as a transformation of Marxism and discusses its

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<sup>6</sup> Annie Kriegel, Eurocommunism: A New Kind of Communism? (Stanford, Hoover, 1978), p.8.

<sup>7</sup> Jean Elleinstein, Ils vous trompent, camarades (Paris, Belfond, 1981), p.165.

<sup>8</sup> According to Elleinstein's words, the communist party is nothing but "la version laïcisée de l'Eglise catholique." See footnote 7.

<sup>9</sup> Central Committees versus Conferences of Bishops or the Pope versus the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or, in a "gallicanistic" way, the different national Secretaries General.





place in the Marxian debate. Both Marxist and non-Marxist authors have written on the subject from this perspective. Ajit Roy, an Indian scholar, for example, is questioning whether Eurocommunism is in accordance with Marxian science.<sup>10</sup> Vladimir Zagladin, at one time the Russian delegate of the Third International in Paris, shows the unity of the Communists of Western Europe for peace and against imperialism.<sup>11</sup> The present study does not deal with this body of literature. It rather deals with the literature that could be characterized as the political science literature.

On Eurocommunism, the literature which is not part of political philosophy is essentially concerned with party politics because Eurocommunism is a movement which has developed through some Western European communist parties. The party politics literature looks at party doctrine, party policies and at the implications of these two for the politics of the countries in which there are Eurocommunist parties and for the politics of the world. This literature looks, for example, at the growth of Western European communism, at the reasons for this growth and at the consequences of the coming to power of a Western European communist party.

Within the party politics literature, a distinction can be made along the line of methodology. One may distinguish between a rigorous approach based on the development of models and hypothesis testings and a less rigorous approach.<sup>12</sup> Very few scholars use the former methodology. The vast majority uses a less rigorous approach which does not test a hypothesis. The majority of the scholars does not even question any point of methodology. These scholars merely state elements which appear reasonable and develop their own logic without trying to reach scientifically elaborated conclusions.

The less rigorous approach has been chosen because up to now, the scholars using the scientific approach have not been interested in pinpointing the characteristics peculiar to the communist parties. They have not explained what specifically distinguishes the communist parties among the Left, because they have treated the doctrine of the parties like any other element. This study will pinpoint the fundamental characteristics of the communist parties. It looks at the subject in a way that can comprehend these fundamental characteristics by taking into special consideration the doctrine of the parties.

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<sup>10</sup> Ajit Roy, Eurocommunism: An Analytical Study (Calcutta, Pearl, 1978).

<sup>11</sup> Vladimir Zagladin, Europe and the Communists (Moscow, Progress, 1977).

<sup>12</sup> An example of the first type of methodology can be found in R. Neal Tannahill, The Communist Parties of Western Europe (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1978).





The claim is made that doctrine is the overriding consideration in the study of the specific of communist parties. Doctrine is considered to be a superstructure which determines the nature of the other elements.<sup>13</sup> The preceding claim is based on two constant properties of communist parties as they developed after 1917. The first of these is democratic centralism. Ever since the Russian revolution, this has implied straight control of each country by its centre. The second is revolution. Explicitly or implicitly, communist parties have looked to the end of democratic competition once they are in power. This thesis will examine the three communist parties to see whether Eurocommunism constitutes enough of a change in those two constant properties to qualify as communism with a human face, or whether the constant properties form a constant superstructure which overrides any liberalization.

Methodologically, there is a theoretical foundation for the less rigorous political science approach followed in this study. Pascal's distinction between "esprit de finesse" and "esprit de géométrie" appears to be very useful in this regard.<sup>14</sup> "L'esprit de finesse" tries to grasp the substance of a subject. It takes the subject without any theoretical framework or preconceived idea of what the substance of the subject could be. The analysis tends to identify some substantial characteristics and present them in their mutual relationship. For example, regarding the foreign policies of the parties, a perusal of the literature has established by "esprit de finesse" that the foreign policy of the parties can be accounted for in large part by analyzing the relations of the parties with Moscow and the communist tenet of imperialism.

Because of its methodology, this research has deliberately neglected certain writings of the non rigorous political science literature and chosen to focus on others. On the one hand, the writings focusing on the doctrinal ideological characteristics of the

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<sup>13</sup> Doctrine is considered here as knowledge for action.

<sup>14</sup> Pascal writes: *Difference entre l'esprit de géométrie et l'esprit de finesse.* En l'un les principes sont palpables mais éloignés de l'usage commun de sorte qu'on à peine à tourner la tête de ce côté-là, manque d'habitude; mais pour peu qu'on l'y tourne, on voit les principes à plein; et il faudrait avoir tout à fait l'esprit faux pour mal raisonner sur des principes si gros qu'il est presque impossible qu'ils échappent. Mais dans l'esprit de finesse, les principes sont dans l'usage commun et devant les yeux de tout le monde. On n'a que faire de tourner la tête, ni de se faire violence; il n'est question que d'avoir bonne vue, mais il faut l'avoir bonne: car les principes sont si déliés et en si grand nombre, qu'il est presque qu'impossible qu'il n'en échappe. Or l'omission d'un principe mène à l'erreur; ainsi il faut avoir la vue bien nette pour voir tous les principes, et ensuite l'esprit juste pour ne pas raisonner faussement sur des principes connus. Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, (Paris, Seuil, 1963), p.576.



Eurocommunist movement have received attention. This type of literature considers the performances of the parties as secondary compared to the intellectual impetus given by the men holding power and the dependence of these men on foreign determinants (that is, ideological links and position of the party on its national political scene). On the other hand, the literature focusing on party analysis (emphasizing membership, electoral results, policies) has been neglected. This study is questioning the "why" of the existence of the parties whatever the constraints upon them and whatever the environment.

The analysis is meant to be both documentary and critical. It is documentary in its historical presentation of the evolution of the three parties (chapter one) as well as in the analysis of the current trends within the PCF, PCI and PCE (chapter two and chapter three). The analysis is critical in its assessment of the evolution of the three parties vis-a-vis both the past and the future Eurocommunist trends in the three parties.





## II. Establishment of Eurocommunism

### A. Creation of Bolshevik Communist Parties

Soon after the Russian Bolshevik revolution, Lenin stood for a schism in the Second International. As the German historian Franz Borkenau wrote:

To him the situation presented itself as follows: the poison of opportunism had been allowed to grow unchecked within the socialist parties of the West. The majorities had been orthodox [to the orders of the Second International] but the opportunists had not been expelled. Then, at a moment of particular difficulty, [the opportunists] had been proved to be the really dominant force within international socialism. A new International would be nothing but a second edition of the old one, and still more defective, unless this primary condition of its downfall was first mended. This could only be done by creating safeguards which would effectively exclude opportunism, there must be ideological control from an orthodox center over the whole party, and it must be subjected to rigid discipline.<sup>15</sup>

Although the German Socialists, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, had been opposed to his plan and although there was no contact or almost none with the victorious countries of World War I, Lenin still decided to create the Third International in 1919.

There could be no doubt as to the leadership of the newly founded International. Compared to the small groups which had joined them, the Russians were giants among dwarfs.<sup>16</sup> The Russians intended to control it from the start and succeeded in doing so. They even imposed their conditions on admissions, because "the absolute rule of the Russian Bolsheviks would be only the better established for [the Comintern], and their absolute rule was, they sincerely believed, the one safeguard of real revolutionism."<sup>17</sup> The Bolsheviks considered that many socialist leaders showed too much opposition to the Russian model of revolution. This opposition had to be expelled, so that a homogenous pro-soviet International could be built. In order to achieve this goal, the Bolsheviks, at the second congress of the Third International, imposed a set of conditions to be agreed to by the members; those were the so-called 21 conditions. The conditions essentially were :

- Ejection of the traitors to The Revolution and replacement by reliable communists. (second condition)
- Acceptance should be given to the Executive Committee of the International which receive total power over the sections(as the different national

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<sup>15</sup> Franz Borkenau, The Communist International (London, Faber and Faber, 1938), p.80.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.163.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.195.





communist parties were called).

"Decisions not only of the world congresses but even of the Executive Committee of the Comintern [overrule] decisions of the national parties". (sixteenth condition)

–Compulsory support to the Soviet Union. (fourteenth condition)

–Within parties, complete power must be given to the central committee: "In the present phase of acute civil war a communist party will only be able to do its duty [if] it is organized with the highest possible degree of centralization and keeps iron discipline; the central committee, backed by the confidence of the members, must be invested with complete power, authority and the most far-reaching qualification of the necessity." (twelfth condition)

–the acceptance of the necessity of periodical purges within the parties' leadership in order to maintain party purity is also required. (thirteenth condition) <sup>18</sup>

Obviously, these conditions were unacceptable to many socialist leaders and members. A split was inevitable and it effectively occurred. The French socialist party split in Tours (December 1920), and the Italian socialist party in Leghorn (February 1921). Such a split, dividing in two the immense majority of the socialist movement, did not occur in Spain, because in that country the socialist movement was already highly divided between several socialist and anarcho-syndicalist groups. In Spain, the communist party did not develop beyond a handful of members before the early thirties.<sup>19</sup>

From the start, the communist parties strictly applied the Bolshevik model of socialism and obeyed the instructions from Moscow. The parties adopted their program with regard to the strategy prescribed to them by the newly founded and Russian-dominated Communist International. Until 1921, the Russians believed in the feasibility of an immediate bolshevik-type revolution in the West. The objectives of the Western European communist parties therefore had to conform to this eventuality. But with the collapse of the German revolution and the suppression of the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet republics and the defeat of the great strikes in France and Italy (1921), the International drew the lessons of these setbacks by abandoning the idea of an immediate revolution. It decided that the communist parties would now settle down and try to win over the majority of the workers before attempting the revolution.<sup>20</sup> In order to reach this goal, the communist parties had to lead the Left in struggles against the Social Democrats as well as against the "Gauchists" or the "Sectarists" (these were mainly Anarcho-Syndicalists). This strategy pursued the Bolshevik idea, which was to clear the

<sup>18</sup> A comment on all the conditions is given by *Ibid.*, pp. 197–198.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p.402.

<sup>20</sup> Neil McInnes, "From Comintern to Polycentrism," in Paolo della Torre, Edward Mortimer and Jonathan Story (eds.), *Eurocommunism. Myth or Reality* (New York, Penguin Books, 1979), p.38.



left spectrum of all that was not typically Bolshevik. The Social Democrats received the same consideration as the Fascists during the twenties and early thirties!<sup>21</sup> According to Imprecorr, an official publication of the Third International:

The national conference of the communist party of Spain put special emphasis upon the fight against the illusion created by the liberal and republican bourgeoisie –naturally their social fascist allies support them to the best of their ability and try to create the impression that it is possible, in Spain, to create a bourgeois democratic regime .... The conference resolved to fight with the utmost energy the attempts of the right and left wing social fascists who, with the support of important sections of the anarchist movement, attempt to form an united front with the liberal and republican bourgeoisie.<sup>22</sup>

The parties developed on the Bolshevik party model. First, democratic centralism was progressively established by the concentration of the decision-making power in the hands of small "political bureaux":

In these 'polit-bureaux', the critical tendencies within the parties had no longer a voice. They represented those few shades of opinion which were allowed to participate in the working out of party policy, and the general trend was to allow finally only one group, one leader with his obedient partisans, to form the political bureau. At the same time, the federal autonomy of the individual regions and districts which made up a national party was seriously curtailed to the point of annihilation.<sup>23</sup>

Second, a strong hierarchical party organization developed throughout the different countries. This organization was based on the working cell because of the bolshevik idea "that revolutionary actions of the proletariat must start from the factories and must fail unless the communist parties obtain a direct hold on the factories."<sup>24</sup> Franz Borkenau showed that this idea was suited to Russia where the communist nuclei were almost the only social organization. In the West the communist nuclei opposed the majority of the socialist and trade-union workers. Eventually new members were squeezed between the owners and the trade-unions. Franz Borkenau concludes: "So long as the communists actually lived in a state of war with the majority of the workers, the nuclei in the factories were a hopeless failure."<sup>25</sup> The central committee bolshevized the entire party organization

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<sup>21</sup> Even after Hitler's victory in January 1933, "the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International declared with reference to the situation in Germany: 'The establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany is the consequence of the Social Democratic policy of collaboration with the Bourgeoisie throughout the entire life of the Weimar Republic...The Communists were right when they called the Social Democrats, "Social Fascists".' Wolfgang Leonhard, Eurocommunism, Challenge for East and West (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), pp.36-37 (this author quotes Degras, Communist International, 3 (1929-1943):261).

<sup>22</sup> Imprecorr, No. 25, 1930; quoted in Borkenau, The Communist International, p.402.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p.358.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p.360.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.361.





by sending circulars. Purges were also frequent. Jacques Fauvet, editor-in-chief of Le Monde and author of a history of the PCF, gives some examples of expulsions during the ten first years of the party and adds:

C'est une génération qui s'éloigne. Mais l'épuration ne passera pas avec elle. Elle est chronique en vertu même de la treizième condition : les partis communistes "doivent procéder à des épurations périodiques de leurs organisations afin d'en écarter les éléments intéressés et petits-bourgeois." Mais il y a plus ... l'Eglise communiste se définit moins par l'affirmation d'un dogme réduit à peu de vérités que par la condamnation renouvelée d'erreurs opposées. Elle se définit en s'amputant.<sup>26</sup>

The link with Moscow was also financial. "Almost all communist parties [were] largely dependent on money from Moscow, money which comes in rather irregularly,... according to the political importance Moscow considers a given party to have at a given moment."<sup>27</sup> But in 1934, both in France and Spain, a sudden change of tone occurred: the Communists fought together with the Socialists in defense of democracy.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du Parti Communiste (Paris, Fayard, 1964), p. 71.

<sup>27</sup> F. Borkenau, The Communist International, p.357.

<sup>28</sup> Under Mussolini's fascist rule, the Italians also had their popular front, in the form of a pact for unity of actions with the the Socialists. (1934, dropped in 1939, and re-established in October, 1941).



## B. The Popular Front Experiences

The popular front experiences which consisted in alliances of the popular political forces (mainly the communist and socialist parties) developed in France and Spain from 1934 until 1939. The events are differently interpreted by authors. Some argue that the popular front strategy was nothing but a pure tactical manoeuvre directed from Moscow with no national or democratic content on the side of the Communists. Others, especially the actual "Eurocommunists", contend that the popular fronts were initiated by the communist parties and constituted the full acceptance of truly democratic principles. These maintain that the popular fronts are at the root of Eurocommunism. The two points of view will be examined in the following paragraphs.<sup>29</sup>

Fernando Claudin, a PCE dissident and critical communist historian, emphasizes that the change of policy from the bolshevik revolutionary strategy to the policy of popular front has been initiated not by any Western European party, nor by the Communist International, but by the USSR. He recalls that the turn first had effect in France, after the Soviet leaders had met with Thorez, the then General Secretary of the PCF, in Moscow and after the reproduction of a Pravda article favorable to a strategy of popular front in L'Humanité, the PCF's newspaper (May 31, 1934). This article said that it was perfectly admissible to propose united action to the socialist leaders. Fernando Claudin argues that Moscow suddenly gave the signal for a 'turn' by the publication of this article.<sup>30</sup>

In a totally different way, Serge Wilikow, a French communist historian, argues that "aux origines du Front Populaire, il y avait aussi bien la politique et l'influence du PCF que les analyses et les réflexions de l'Internationale."<sup>31</sup> This author provides many quotes of communist leaders in order to justify his thesis: "Les Communistes décident de saisir toutes les occasions pour manifester leur conception de l'unité ouvrière se réalisant dans

<sup>29</sup> However, note that all the observers argue that the popular front policies were suitable if not necessary for the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

<sup>30</sup> Fernando Claudin, Comintern to Cominform. (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1975), v. 1, p. 174. On this subject, see also George Lavau, A quoi sert le parti communiste français ? (Paris, Fayard, 1981), p. 285. Fernando Claudin adds an interesting discussion on the question of whether the leaders of the Executive Committee of the Communist International proposed the move and Stalin acquiesced or whether Stalin did it alone. He shows that the latter answer is the accurate one. (pp. 175–176).

<sup>31</sup> Serge Wilikow, Le PCF, étapes et problèmes, 1920–1972. (Paris, Editions sociales, 1981), p. 105.





la lutte commune des travailleurs communistes et socialistes," or, for example, quoting Maurice Thorez in L'Humanité, "Nous répétons sans nous lasser: le front [populaire] est possible et il est nécessaire. Il est indispensable."<sup>32</sup> For Wolikow, the only reason why the French popular front was not accomplished before the spring of 1934 was the refusal of the socialist party, the SFIO, to cooperate. All the quotes this author gives are directed to the workers. Wolikow does not provide the other side of the communist position which was, as it will be seen, an antagonistic view of the SFIO and the Radicals. Indeed he forgets to mention that the communists' appeal to reach a popular front was directed to the working-class and contained strong polemics against "the treacherous Social Democratic leaders." Had Wilikow been right, the Eurocommunist movement would have started with the popular front experience. First the PCF and then the PCI would have stood autonomously from Moscow. But Wilikow is partisan in his presentation of the facts.

There are many Communist declarations and writings of the time, showing the continual opposition of the Communists to an alliance with the socialist party as, for example, this article published February 7, 1934 in L'Humanité:

Plus que jamais nous fraternisons avec les ouvriers socialistes, plus que jamais nous les appelons à l'action commune avec leurs camarades communistes. Et plus que jamais nous dénonçons les chefs socialistes, le parti socialiste, serviteur de la bourgeoisie, dernier rempart de la société capitaliste. Nous continuerons de combattre le parti SFIO, principal soutien de la bourgeoisie française.<sup>33</sup>

In order to present the communist position vis-à-vis the socialist, Jacques Fauvet asserts: "Il ne faut pas que les socialistes pensent du bien de leur parti; il faut qu'ils en pensent assez de mal pour passer au parti communiste ou tout au moins accepter à ses conditions le front [populaire]."<sup>34</sup>

In fact, the PCF certainly made a political turn in the spring of 1934. Although it formally had supported the idea of the popular front prior to 1934, it did not accept the plurality of parties within this front which in 1934 it had accepted. Consequently, it publicly ceased from then on to accuse the SFIO of being a party of "traitors". In conclusion, one can say that the decision of the turn cannot be found within France where nothing prior to the 23rd of May 1934 Pravda article indicated the acceptance by the

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp. 122–138.

<sup>33</sup> Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du Parti Communiste Français, p. 135.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 136.



Communists of the SFIO as a political partner.<sup>35</sup>

Franz Borkenau saw the turn toward the popular front strategy as an instrument of Russian foreign policy which was aimed at ending Russia's isolation, to inspire confidence and to wipe out Russia's past: "Russia sought a close alliance with the potential adversaries of Germany and Japan. First among these adversaries [ was ] France ..., it was desirable to bring Britain and the United States into the same fold."<sup>36</sup> Also, one may wonder how great was the national autonomy of the PCF and the PCE when one considers that their leadership easily accepted the 1939 German–Russian pact. Of course, the PCE had no choice after Franco's victory but to join Russia and therefore accept its policies. But the acceptance by the PCF of a non–aggression pact between Hitler and Stalin was a betrayal of France. The pact went contrary to the defense of France against Hitler. Many of the PCF's militants and MPs thought that the pact was indeed incompatible with the defense of France. Jacques Fauvet has given evidence of the destruction by militants of their party membership card and of MPs' resignations. These events led him to conclude that the party was not national enough to oppose itself to Moscow and, as Borkenau thinks, that the turn to the popular front was an instrument of Russian foreign policy.<sup>37</sup>

But what exactly did the popular fronts represent? It already has been seen that some authors argue that the popular front strategy was for the communist parties nothing but a mere tactic without change of perspective. For these authors, the communist parties would have accepted democracy in order to reach power and establish a republic of Soviets. In this conception, the Communists had no democratic principles to defend.<sup>38</sup> Santiago Carrillo and Manuel Azcarate, the current General–Secretary and another leading member the PCE, contend that the PCE Eurocommunism and its claim for a "democratic revolution" have their roots in the popular front experience.<sup>39</sup> Such a contention is not commonly made by the PCF leaders. George Marchais, for example, does not seem to

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<sup>35</sup> The Soviet decision to change the policy of the International is developed by Neil McInnes, "From Comintern to Polycentrism", p.46. Note that Serge Wilikow mentions the necessity of an alliance with the socialist leaders for the first time by commenting on the Pravda article. Serge Wilikow, Le PCF, étapes et problèmes (1920–1972), p. 139.

<sup>36</sup> Franz Borkenau, The Communist International, p.338.

<sup>37</sup> Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du Part Communiste, pp.245–259.

<sup>38</sup> See for example, Grant Amyot, The Italian Communist Party, (New York, St Martins Press, 1981), p.36.

<sup>39</sup> Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), pp. 120–129; Manuel Azcarate, "The Present State of Eurocommunism : Its Main Features, Political and Theoretical" in Richard Kindersley, (ed.), In Search of Eurocommunism, (London, The Macmillan Press, 1981), p.27.





want to make a connection between the French popular front and the PCF Eurocommunist trend.<sup>40</sup> Because the two popular front experiences present important differences – essentially, civil war and PCE participation in the Spanish government versus PCF support of the government in France – one must differentiate between them.

In France, during the years of the popular front, some traditional positions of the PCF – beyond a strategy of alliances – changed. It began at that time, for example, to have a nationalist stance in the defense of France against German fascism, or in its analysis of the economy based on the concept of national production potential.<sup>41</sup> This nationalism, however, had its limits: "It is of public knowledge that the Communists are only ready to sacrifice everything to the Russian nation. The interpretation they give to their nationalism must always coincide exactly with the interests of Russia."<sup>42</sup>

Although the PCF often claimed to be struggling for democracy and for liberty, Serge Wilikow must however recognize:

En fait la défense des formes démocratiques de l'Etat bourgeois et sa transformation révolutionnaire demeurent complètement distinguées de même que la forme et le caractère de classe de l'Etat. L'état prolétarien étant conçu comme radicalement autre, il ne pouvait y avoir que solution de continuité et pas de transition entre démocratie bourgeoise et démocratie de type nouveau.<sup>43</sup>

In Spain, Santiago Carrillo argues that the popular front was fully democratic: "There was a legal government, a parliament, national institutions in Catalonia and the Basque country,... trade unions, youth organizations of various kinds, a free press (very free indeed in view of the war situation), freedom of expression and assembly and freedom to demonstrate."<sup>44</sup> He explains the failure of the popular front in terms of military defeats. Carrillo contends that the popular front was throughout its existence a democratic stable form of government. Franz Borkenau has a different version of the Spanish popular front. He shows that, if the popular front originally was democratic, once the Communists entered it, they gradually suppressed its democratic form:

In Spain, the Communists decided that the one way to save democracy was to

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<sup>40</sup> In the following relatively recent books published by Georges Marchais, no mention is made of the popular front experiences: Le défi démocratique (Paris, Grasset, 1978); La politique du parti communiste français (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1974); Parlons franchement (Paris, Grasset, 1977); L'espoir au présent (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1980).

<sup>41</sup> Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du Parti Communiste Français, p. 188.

<sup>42</sup> Franz Borkenau, The Communist International, p. 395.

<sup>43</sup> Serge Wilikow, Le PCF, étapes et problèmes, 1920–1972, p. 192.

<sup>44</sup> Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, p. 122; see also Santiago Carrillo, Dialogue in Spain (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), pp. 54–68.





abolish it. Definite attempts were made to merge with the Socialists and the Republicans. In the end, communist policy was aiming at a democracy controlled by only one party, defended by an army, a police, and a civil service under the control of Moscow.<sup>45</sup>

In fact, when the Communists entered the government (September 1936), the civil war was by far the major preoccupation of this government and, as early as March 1937, half of Spain already was controlled by Franco.<sup>46</sup> The PCE hardly could be democratic in this situation; rather, it was predominantly military. Fernando Claudin calls it "the military party of the Spanish republic".<sup>47</sup> The PCE controlled the International Brigades, the troops sent by the Comintern; it also controlled the whole Spanish army. The study of the evolution of the war from the republican side is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that wartime is the worst time to evaluate the democratic character of a party's program and its acts.<sup>48</sup> Even if the PCE stood for an intermediate stage of revolution (democratic revolution), one may question Carrillo's contention that the popular front was democratic when one knows that the leftist socialist Prime Minister Caballero stood for a revolution of the bolshevik type; when one also knows that each organization in the republican camp had its own conception of the revolution and acted in its own way; and, finally, when one remembers the Trotskyists' suppression (affaire Andreu Nin).<sup>49</sup> Wolfgang Leonhart, a German historian, insisting on the fundamental differences between the popular front experiences and the Eurocommunist movement provides our final conclusion for this section.

- a. The popular front in no way changed the final goal of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the establishment of socialism according to the Soviet model.
- b. There was no independence from the Soviet Union. At the same Seventh World Congress, which proclaimed the popular front policy, Stalin was portrayed as "leader, teacher, and friend of the proletariat and of the suppressed peoples of the entire world," and as "the beloved leader of international proletarianism." All Communists, in the event of war, were required to assist the triumph of the Red army over the imperialist armies by any means and at any price. The subordination to Soviet foreign policy was not questioned.
- c. At the time of the popular front policy, a Great Purge, which decimated almost the entire apparatus of the Comintern, took place in the Soviet Union. Most functionaries who had played a leading role in the Comintern,...were

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<sup>45</sup> Franz Borkenau, The Communist International, p.410.

<sup>46</sup> Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1961), p.400.

<sup>47</sup> Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement, v. 1, p.230.

<sup>48</sup> See the brutality of the Comintern's political commissioners, the "non-orthodox" activities of the Servicio de Investigacion Militar which was controlled by the Communists (Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p.492), the execution of political prisoners (*Ibid.*, p.492), and the absence of religious tolerance on the republican side (*Ibid.* p.38-44).

<sup>49</sup> Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, pp.452-455 and Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement, pp.218-231.



arrested.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Wolfgang Leonhart, Eurocommunism: A New Kind of Communism?, p.38. On point c, see also Annie Kriegel, Eurocommunism: A New Kind of Communism?, p.95.





## C. In Search for Autonomy

### The PCI

Togliatti, the PCI General Secretary at the end of World War II, developed a 'new road to socialism'. Mostly because of its democratic aspects and national character, this 'new road to socialism' constitutes autonomous paths from Moscow and the communist international. But before analyzing Togliatti's positions, the writer will examine their philosophical roots. One must know that Togliatti's standpoints and the subsequent discussions within the PCI were mostly based on Gramsci's theoretical Marxist thought. For these reasons, it is worthwhile to examine the content of Gramsci's Marxism and more precisely to see how he diverges from Marx and from Lenin.

Gramsci's political thought develops from an analytical distinction that he draws between the situation of most Western European states during the twenties and that of the czarist Russian state. From the analysis of Western industrialized states, Gramsci builds an original path to a socialist revolution. Gramsci first tells us that the analysis of the situation of the state is of primary importance for a revolutionary. The state is the principal object against which a revolutionary man has to struggle. By knowing the exact reality of the state, the revolutionary man is able to determine the strategy he has to adopt:

The concept of revolutionary and of internationalist in the modern sense of the word, is correlative with the precise concept of state. Little understanding of the state means little consciousness (and understanding of the state exists not only when one defends it, but also when one attacks it in order to overthrow it); hence low level of effectiveness of the parties [exists].<sup>51</sup>

According to Gramsci, the pre-1917 Russian state was very different from most of the Western European states including the Italian in the twenties, because Russia was almost exclusively rural while many Western European regions including Northern Italy were already industrialized:

In the advanced capitalist countries, the ruling class possesses political and organizational reserves which it did not possess...in Russia. This means that even the most serious economic crises do not have immediate repercussions in

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<sup>51</sup> Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks (hereafter quoted: SPN) (New York, International Publishers, 1971), p.275.





the political sphere. The state apparatus is far more resistant than it is often possible to believe; and it succeeds, at moment of crisis, in organizing greater forces loyal to the regime than the depth of the crisis might lead one to suppose.<sup>52</sup>

The difference between Western industrialized states and Russia derived from the presence in the former of a strong civil society which was primitive in Russia.

Gramsci uses a Marxian concept, that of civil society, but gives it another meaning. The civil society has a broader content for Gramsci than for Marx for whom it matches the economic structure. Gramsci defines civil society as "the ensemble of organisms commonly called private."<sup>53</sup> These organisms include the unions, the church, the schools, etc.; they are the organisms by which the ideology is created. For both, Marx and Gramsci, civil society represents the active and positive moment of the historical development, but it is a part of the infrastructure for Marx when it is a part of the superstructure for Gramsci.<sup>54</sup>

This is the reason why it has been said that Gramsci, contrary to Marx, gives the dominant role to the superstructure in the dialectical relations. Marx, by insisting on the infrastructure, gives the preference to the economical or social facts or to necessity, as opposed to politics or to the decisional consciousness which can change necessity. Marx follows the positivist trend of his time (see for example, the works of Durkheim, Auguste Comte, Renan). For Marx, sociology stood as the factual science of the groups and naturally supersedes politics understood as a management toward a wanted and conscious end. On the same line, one can put Gramsci's opposition to "mechanistic materialism" as developed by many Marxists.<sup>55</sup>

Let us return to the state. It has been seen that, according to Gramsci, Western European states possess and develop strong civil societies which make them more complex than the czarist Russian state. In fact, Gramsci draws a distinction between the

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<sup>52</sup> Gramsci's reflections mainly developed from his experience of an "intellectual" among the Turinese metal-workers. With Togliatti and two other comrades, he founded (1919) in Turin, "L'ordine nuovo", a weekly mostly concerned with the organization of factory councils. Antonio Gramsci, Selection from Political Writings, 1912-1926, (hereafter quoted : SPW), Q. Hoare, ed. (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), pp.408-409.

<sup>53</sup> SPN, p.12.

<sup>54</sup> Norberto Bobbio, "Gramsci, la concezione della societa civile", in Chantal Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p.15.

<sup>55</sup> See for example, Gramsci's criticisms of Rosa Luxemburg's "spontaneism" in Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politica e sullo Stato moderno. (Turin, Einaudi, 1964), p.65. "Mechanistic materialism" is the idea that revolution must inexorably come sooner or later in capitalist countries because capitalism, as predicted by Marx, is doomed to be destroyed from the inside.



state in its narrow sense, that is, the state apparatus of coercion or the liberal "nightwatchman" state and the state as a whole. The latter includes the former plus civil society. Gramsci calls the state apparatus of coercion a political society.<sup>56</sup> In the civil society sphere, the leading class exercises hegemony over the other classes; in the political society sphere, the leading class exercises domination by commanding the coercive apparatus of the state.

Hegemony, according to Gramsci, is the leading role the dominant class exercises in the formation and existence of the consensual basis of any political system.<sup>57</sup> Any civil society is based on a general consensus to accept the rule of the leading class. This leading class, essentially through the instruments of culture, morality and education that it controls, holds its hegemonic position in civil society. The leading class also controls the state apparatus. According to Gramsci, a socialist revolution will be realized in the Western industrialized European countries when and only when the proletariat will possess hegemony over civil society. Dominance in the political society sphere will naturally follow.

Gramsci's way to revolution in Italy is different from the bolshevik one, because the Bolsheviks only had to seize a state in which civil society was primitive. In a state with a strong civil society, the revolutionaries must both seize power and possess hegemony over the civil society. In order to differentiate the two different ways of revolution, Gramsci resorts to a comparison of war. He opposes what he calls the war of movement to the war of position or, as suggested to him by World War I, to the war of trenches. The Russian 1917 bolshevik revolution was a war of movement. In this war, a vanguard party was able to seize the power of a rudimentary state. In the West, Gramsci declares that a war of position is necessary in order first to secure the hegemonic position of the proletariat over civil society:

The war of position demands enormous sacrifices by infinite masses of people. So an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is necessary, and hence a more "interventionist" government, which will take the offensive more openly against the oppositionists and organize permanently the "impossibility" of internal disintegration. In politics, the "war of position", once won is decisive. <sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Antonio Gramsci, Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura (Turin, Einaudi, 1964), p.9.

<sup>57</sup> Walter L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution, (Berkeley, University of California, 1976), pp.170–171.

<sup>58</sup> SPN, pp.238–239.





In Italy, a war of position has to be waged by the party which must secure an educational, moral and cultural hegemony of the proletariat over civil society. As Lenin has done, Gramsci gives to the party the functions of political direction and of moral and cultural reform;<sup>59</sup> but, contrary to Lenin, Gramsci says that a moral and cultural reform of the masses is necessary as an end and not as a mere means to facilitate revolution, because of the necessity to reach hegemony over civil society. One comes back to the primacy of politics or consciousness in order to transform necessities and conditions to reach a conscious and wanted end. The proletariat has to manage, with the help of the party, to transform economical and social domination into instruments of liberation:

One can use the term "catharsis" to show the passage from the purely economical (or egoistic-passional) moment to the ethico-political moment; that is to the superior elaboration of the structure into superstructure in the consciousness of men. This also means the passage from "subjective to objective" or from "necessity" to "liberty." The structure of external force which crushes man, assimilates him to it and renders him passive, is transformed in a means of liberty, in a means to create a new ethico-political form and generating new initiatives.<sup>60</sup>

Therefore, contrary to Lenin's conception of a vanguard party, Gramsci stresses the need for a mass party in which the masses play an active role.

Nevertheless, Gramsci insists on the crucial role of the intellectuals.<sup>61</sup> As for Lenin, an iron discipline within the party secured by democratic centralism and the refusal of factions is also of primary importance for Gramsci.<sup>62</sup> Gramsci argues: "posing the problem of the organization of faction in a communist party, means posing the problem of a split."<sup>63</sup>

Yet, he opposes democratic centralism to bureaucratic centralism. In the latter,

centralization, unity of approach and conception, [turns] into intellectual stagnation. Centralization and unity [is] understood in too mechanical a fashion: the Central Committee, indeed the Executive Committee [is] the entire party, instead of representing and leading it.<sup>64</sup>

On the opposite in the former,

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<sup>59</sup> This is a point on which Gramsci is near Lukacs of Story and Consciousness of Class. For a brief comparison between the two authors, see Jean-Marc Potté, La pensée politique de Gramsci (Ottawa, Editions Parti pris, 1970), p.205.

<sup>60</sup> Antonio Gramsci, Il materialismo storico (Turin, Einaudi, 1964), p.40; translated by the author.

<sup>61</sup> On this point, see particularly, Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura (Turin, Einaudi, 1964).

<sup>62</sup> On this last point, see A. Gramsci, La costruzione del partito comunista 1923-1926 (Turin, Einaudi, 1971), p.225.

<sup>63</sup> Quoted from Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics (London, Croom Helm, 1980), p.88.

<sup>64</sup> SPW, p.290.





the bolshevik party must...function in contact with the masses, whatever the conditions may be...and the whole party [must be] articulated as working body among the masses.<sup>65</sup>

Or, in democratic centralism,

...there is a continual adaptation of the organisation to the real movement, a matching of thrusts from below with orders from above, a continuous insertion of elements thrown up from the depths of the rank and file into the solid framework of the leadership apparatus which ensures continuity and the regular accumulation of experience.<sup>66</sup>

Gramsci points out the need for internal active participation of party members, but his reflection on the political leadership focuses more on the necessity for unity than on the respect of democratic principles in the decision-making process of the party. "The principle of elections of the leading bodies --internal democracy--," he says, "is not an absolute one, but relative to the conditions of political struggle."<sup>67</sup>

Gramsci also refers to the formation of an "intellectual and moral historical bloc" in order to change the hegemony of the actual leading class. A historical bloc is "an effort to infuse [the] hegemony throughout society above all by means of class alliances."<sup>68</sup> Note that the party still has a leading role in the "historical bloc".

One may ask if the party at the state level and in the process to reach hegemony over civil society, will follow democratic rules to seize the power of the state. In other words, does the "historical bloc" consist of a plurality of parties? Two answers come out of the literature. Jean-Marc Piotte, basing his argumentation on Gramsci's analysis of the three levels of relations of force (economical, political and military),<sup>69</sup> argues that Gramsci means that the proletariat has to use a military strategy to reach an hegemonic position.<sup>70</sup> This answer is not totally satisfactory because Gramsci's purpose in this part of his work is to see if "the study of how situations should be analyzed, in other words the study of how to establish the various levels of the relations of force, offers an opportunity for an

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<sup>65</sup> SPW, p.366.

<sup>66</sup> SPN, pp. 189–199.

<sup>67</sup> SPW, p.362.

<sup>68</sup> Walter L. Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution*, p.176

<sup>69</sup> Gramsci's analysis of these three levels can be found in *Note sul Machiavelli*, pp. 40–50, and SPN, pp. 175–185.

<sup>70</sup> J-M Piotte, *La Pensee Politique de Gramsci*, p.188; in the same vein, see P.A. Allum, *The Italian Communist Party since 1945* (Reading, University of Reading Graduate School, 1970), pp.8–9, who argues: "although conquest of "civil society" by means of a "war of position" was the principal novelty of Gramsci's strategy, he always maintained that it needed to be supplemented by means of "war of movement" to be successful."



elementary exposition of the science and art of politics."<sup>71</sup> In this passage, he does not at all intend to provide a plan for a revolutionary strategy.

On the other hand, Anne Showstack Sassoon and Chantal Mouffe, arguing from Gramsci's distinction between democratic centralism and bureaucratic centralism, declare that "the logic of the fundamental concept of hegemony points to the necessity of a continuing plurality of political and social organizations."<sup>72</sup> Chantal Mouffe adds: "but it is a pluralism which is always located within the hegemony of the working class."<sup>73</sup> Anne Sassoon makes an argument in favour of their thesis by quoting Gramsci: "even if no other legal parties exist, other parties in fact always do exist and other tendencies cannot be legally coerced; and, against these, polemics are unleashed and struggles are fought as in a game of blind man's bluff."<sup>74</sup> Anne Sassoon goes on by saying: "This elimination of pluralism reproduces what Gramsci calls bureaucratic centralism in which it is impossible to achieve a collective will, a positive unity, a true democracy because, [as Gramsci says], political questions are disguised as cultural ones, and as such become insoluble."<sup>75</sup> Two observations may be made from those affirmations. First, Gramsci never makes the link between the absence of pluralism and bureaucratic centralism and still less with the absence of "true democracy". Second, Gramsci does not argue for pluralism in this passage. Incidentally, in the description of the new prince, that is the party, he only shows the inability of the one-party system to avoid the continuance of indirect political function by illegal political parties.

To conclude the question of Gramsci's acceptance of political pluralism, one surely can say that Gramsci is far from explicit on this subject as indicated by the fact that the question is seldom raised by Gramsci's commentators. Therefore, many controversial as well as sterile interpretations are possible. Yet, Anne Sassoon acknowledges that Gramsci is silent on the precise forms of organizations of the hegemony.<sup>76</sup>

A last point in Gramsci's Marxism is the national character of the revolution.

Gramsci puts the stress on the Italian character of the PCI struggle. In fact, his whole

<sup>71</sup> A. Gramsci, Note sul Machiavelli, p.40; or SPN, p.175.

<sup>72</sup> This passage is quoted from Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, p.230. For the same position, see also, Chantal Mouffe Gramsci and Marxist theory, p.15.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, p.15.

<sup>74</sup> A. Gramsci, SPN, p.149.

<sup>75</sup> Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, p.231.

<sup>76</sup> Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, p.227.







political thought is based on an historical analysis of the Risorgimento:

Gramsci's writing on the Risorgimento deals with those forces and movements of the nineteenth century that formed the modern structure of the Italian state with which the proletariat now has to grapple. Gramsci's notes on the Risorgimento ... [constituted] the point of departure for the whole of his theoretical, historical work.... Gramsci considers it the task of every philosopher-politician (as well as of the "collective" intellectual party) to interpret his (and its) own history in similar fashion since this history inevitably converges with that of the nation. Only in this way can "thought" become "life", and theory be transformed into the thought and actions of the masses, the nexus of theory and "praxis" finally grown conscious.<sup>77</sup>

Originating from national history, the revolutionary praxis has a national character. This does not mean that Gramsci does not see an international dimension to the proletarian revolution. He says: "[The party] must study the national relations of forces and manage them with regard to the international perspectives and orders."<sup>78</sup> Jean-Marc Potté interprets the last text in this way: "Gramsci does not ignore international orders, but he gives them more of an indicative sense than an obligatory one. In the same way, the experiences of the Russian revolutionaries must be more an incentive to study his own national situation than an order to execute."<sup>79</sup>

To sum up this brief presentation of Gramsci's political thought, one can say that Gramsci certainly develops an original Marxism in many ways: (1)importance of civil society, (2)primacy of the superstructure in the dialectical relations and emphasis on an intellectual and cultural hegemony of the proletariat over civil society prior to seizing power, (3)importance of a mass party and of democratic centralism within this party, (4)possibility of party alliances (historical bloc) but continual leading role of the communist party (his acceptance of parliamentary democracy and political pluralism can be questioned), and (5) Italian road to socialism.

As has been previously indicated, Palmiro Togliatti, the PCI General Secretary, at the end of World War II, developed a party program, the basis of which reflected Gramsci's thought. Togliatti's program, its democratic significance, the reason of its adoption and its relative permanence as the basis of the PCI will be considered in the following paragraphs.

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<sup>77</sup> Antonio Gramsci, Letters from Prison, Lynne Lawner, ed. (New York, Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 51-52.

<sup>78</sup> A. Gramsci, Note sul Machiavelli, p. 14; translated by the author.

<sup>79</sup> J-M Potté, La Pensée Politique de Gramsci, p. 176.



Togliatti's program advocated a "progressive democracy" as a "via italiana al socialismo" and the formation of a new party which had to be the organizational expression of the new program.<sup>80</sup> For Togliatti, progressive democracy meant the acceptance of the Italian parliamentary regime in a transitional stage to revolution. He argued:

We want a democratic Italy....As a communist party, as the party of the working class, we claim the right to participate in the construction of the new Italy...,and[we speak], not of a pure democracy, but of a [progressive democracy], and the value of this definition is found precisely in the fact that it recognizes and affirms this tendency towards a profound upheaval carried through with legality.<sup>81</sup>

Togliatti also announced a strategy of collaboration and national unity which implied the need to construct a system of alliances with other political parties and social groups:

If we want the government and its actions to be in conformity with the democratic will of the majority, the mass parties of the left and the Christian Democratic party must collaborate not in a temporary way, reserving the right to attack and destroy each other at the first opportunity, but in a permanent way, with a long prospect of common reconstruction activity.<sup>82</sup>

The General Secretary of the PCI used in his description of political alliances almost the same words Gramsci had used previously. Gramsci spoke of an "historical bloc", Togliatti of "a bloc of forces historically and politically determined."<sup>83</sup>

The PCI progressive democracy was also a typically national path to socialism. Togliatti particularly insisted on the national character of the PCI's new program and took his distance from Moscow.<sup>84</sup>

The party also was renewed at the end of World War II. The essential novelty of the "nuovo partito" was its passage from a small "parti de cadre" to a numerous mass party. One must not forget that three years after its creation (1924), the PCI had been outlawed by Mussolini and it never had the time to develop as a mass party until the outbreak of World War II. Its increase in membership also changed the stance of the party. Togliatti wrote in the autumn of 1944 in Rinascita, the cultural review of the PCI:

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<sup>80</sup> The principal speeches of Palmiro Togliatti in which he developed this program can be found in Il Partito Comunista Italiano (Milan, Nuova Accademia, 1958); Il Partito (Roma, Rinascita, 1964); La via Italiana al Socialismo (Roma, Riuniti, 1964); Discorsi alla Costituente (Roma, 1958).

<sup>81</sup> P. Togliatti, La Via Italiana al Socialismo, quoted by P.A. Allum, The Italian Communist Party since 1945, under note 7, p.37.

<sup>82</sup> P. Togliatti, Rinascita, 4, January-February, 1947, p. 2.

<sup>83</sup> P. Togliatti, Discorsi alla costituente (Roma, Riuniti, 1958), p. 155.

<sup>84</sup> P. Togliatti, "La nostra lotta per la democrazia e per il socialismo", Critica Marxista, n. 4-5 (1964), p. 191.





First of all, and this is the essential point, the new party is not only a party of the working class but of the people, which no longer limits itself to a role of criticism and propaganda but enters positively and constructively in the life of the country. The working class which in the past limited itself to a role of opposition and criticism intends today to assume a position of leadership along with other consistently democratic forces. The new party is a party which is able to translate into action this new stand of the working class, by means of its own policies and its own activities by transforming therefore its own organization for this aim. At the same time, the party that we have in mind has to be an Italian national party.<sup>85</sup>

One may now ask what were the determinants of such a policy of collaboration and national unity from the PCI's side. One may also question the real significance of the turn.

First, and without any doubt, the fascist past contributed to foster a policy of that kind. As Professor Donald Blackmer, an American political scientist and author of several books on the PCI, noted:

Its experience with fascism strongly influenced the postwar strategy of the PCI. In its analysis, the party emphasized the role that division among working class and democratic forces had played in the advent of fascism and insisted on the importance of fascism as a mass phenomenon and in the significance of middle class support as one of the basis for the survival of the fascist regime.<sup>86</sup>

The resistance against fascism was also an experience which gave the PCI leaders and militants the personal capacity and desire for alliances with forces outside the working class.

Second, the disastrous experience of the Spanish popular front, which Togliatti knew of very well because he had been a representative of the Comintern in Spain from 1936 to 1939, is also an element which can explain the new policy of the PCI. Remembering his Spanish experience, Togliatti had a great concern "to separate rigidly the two phases of the popular front strategy, the democratic and the 'socialist' by doing nothing to alienate the potential allies of the middle classes and the Bourgeoisie."<sup>87</sup>

Third, Lawrence Gray states that "la Via Italiana al Socialismo" also developed as a result of internal dissensions within the PCI. According to Gray, Togliatti would have put the stress on Gramsci's heritage because this heritage would have been a global and suitable view to preventing factionalism within the party:

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<sup>85</sup> P. Togliatti, *Rinascita*, 1; Oct–Nov–Dec 1944, p.4.

<sup>86</sup> Donald Blackmer, "Continuity and Change in Post War Italian Communism", in Donald Blackmer and Sydney Tarrow, eds., *Communism in France and in Italy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975), p.27.

<sup>87</sup> Grant Amyot, *The Italian Communist Party*, pp.45–46.





The PCI was greatly divided between a weak and often adventure prone position in Southern Italy and a strong, highly organized partisan presence in Northern Italy. Yet, Togliatti had to maintain a global view of party needs. To find the strategic design to lead the party to new strength in Gramsci and his strategic perspective, Togliatti found the legitimacy and perhaps the inspiration he needed.<sup>88</sup>

Finally, one may ask if the policy did not also originate from international factors. Norman Kogan, an American scholar, considers that the geo-strategic position in which Italy was at the liberation, was a determinant factor for the adoption by the PCI of a legal way to power:

Italy is a peninsula of Western Europe that juts into the Mediterranean sea; the American and the British navies dominated that sea. Within a few weeks after the end of the war in Italy, Togliatti went to Milan, the center of the partisan resistance in the north to inform his comrades that the party would have to follow the legal, not the revolutionary way to power. There were over one million Anglo-American troops in Italy, and Winston Churchill had demonstrated a few months earlier in Greece that he would not hesitate to crush a revolt. Italy was not located where a Red Army could engage in successful counter-intervention. Even the most orthodox of Communists would have to recognize that a successful revolutionary strategy in Italy could come only after the balance of forces in Europe had shifted decisively and irrevocably in favor of the Soviet bloc.<sup>89</sup>

Fernando Claudin presents this policy as having originated in an arrangement between the "Big Three" winners of World War I, an arrangement in which Russia would have played an important role: "In reality, it was a 'Big Three' operation, and according to Soviet sources, the credit for the idea belongs to the Soviet Union. Stalin had ruled out that solution immediately it became clear that Italy would be liberated by the allied arms."<sup>90</sup> Yet Lawrence Gray argues that the acceptance of the Western type of democracy by the PCI was in conformity with the needs of Soviet foreign policy and [part of] a Soviet tactical move on an international level.<sup>91</sup>

But, what kind of democracy did Togliatti advocate? Did democracy really mean for him the acceptance of political pluralism or of the democratic alternation in governmental position?

Togliatti's speeches do not reveal the kind of democracy the PCI Secretary General had in mind. Therefore, controversial discussions have taken place as there had been on

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<sup>88</sup> Lawrence Gray, "From Gramsci to Togliatti" in The Italian Communist Party, Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Gray, eds., (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1980).

<sup>89</sup> Norman Kogan, "Italian Communism, the Working Class and Organized Catholicism", The Journal of Politics, August 1966, pp.531-532.

<sup>90</sup> Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement, pt.2, pp. 351-352.

<sup>91</sup> Lawrence Gray, "From Gramsci to Togliatti", p.40.





Gramsci's position. The writer expresses the same doubt on Togliatti's acceptance of pluralism as he did on Gramsci. On this subject, Giorgio Napolitano, a prominent PCI leader, in an interview with the British historian Eric Hobsbawm, argues that the PCI was fully involved in pluralism at that time.<sup>92</sup> One cannot deny that the movement towards accepting the rules of the political game in a situation of political opposition was fully entrenched in the PCI doctrine. And such acceptance has remained unchanged until now. Indeed, from the end of World War II, the PCI did not change its basic position in favor of a transitory stage to socialism as a part of its Italian road to socialism despite pressures from Moscow and internal dissensions. This includes the idea that "a viable form of [revolutionary] government could not be created in such a complex and pluralistic society without mustering the support of a very large alliance of political and social forces."<sup>93</sup>

Of course, changes occurred in the post-war period but these were minor and did not affect the basic strategy outlined by Togliatti. As relatively important changes in the basic principles of the PCI doctrine, one can list, for example, the implicit rejection of the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat by the adoption in 1956 of the "programmatic declaration,"<sup>94</sup> or the rejection of the reference to "Marxism-Leninism" in the party's name. Of course, the fundamental principles of the Italian road to socialism, as Togliatti had outlined in 1944, also were challenged from outside and inside the PCI.

At the time of the creation of the Cominform whose purpose was mainly to reinforce Soviet control on the communist world, Moscow put pressure on the PCI in order to react to independent national paths taken by some Western European parties.<sup>95</sup> Togliatti's program was also criticized from the inside.<sup>96</sup> An organized left wing which developed under the leadership of Pietro Ingrao strongly criticized the policy of alliances with the middle classes.<sup>97</sup> It is interesting to note that even after it was ousted from the government, the PCI kept its policy and maintained its respect for democracy even more

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<sup>92</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Giorgio Napolitano, The Italian Road to Socialism (Westport, Lawrence Hill, 1977), pp. 12–13.

<sup>93</sup> Gianfranco Pasquino, "From Togliatti to the compromesso storico: A party with a governmental vocation" in The Italian Communist Party, Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Gray, ed., p.77.

<sup>94</sup> Grant Amyot, The Italian Communist Party, p. 50.

<sup>95</sup> Wolfgang Leonhart, Eurocommunism, pp.47–48; or Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement, pt.2, p.315.

<sup>96</sup> See affaire Secchia in Lawrence Gray, "From Gramsci to Togliatti", p. 28.

<sup>97</sup> Grant Amyot in The Italian Communist Party gives the position of this left wing and the discussions it created within the PCI, pp.57–72.





strongly. The PCI was ousted in May 1947 and "in the autumn under pressure from the Cominform, the PCI suddenly changed its tactics to street action and militancy. But these activities were not pursued with conviction and were readily dropped in December."<sup>98</sup> The keeping of its strategy by the PCI led Giorgio Napolitano to say: "In those years of the cold war, in those years when Christian Democrats had the absolute majority in Parliament and, in practice, the political monopoly, we continued to develop the implications of our choice of democracy."<sup>99</sup> Eric Hobsbawm adds: "It is very important that the Communist Party never let itself become isolated by its adversaries but continued to play a political role through participation in national politics."<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> P.A. Allum, The Italian Communist Party since 1945, p.13.

<sup>99</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Giorgio Napolitano, The Italian Road to Socialism, p.19.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p.21.



## The PCF

At the end of World War II, the PCF enjoyed widespread popularity. It even became the first party of France in terms of votes cast and seats held.<sup>101</sup> Its electoral strength made it an obligatory component of any kind of governmental alliance for the purpose of material rebuilding. At that time, its policy was one of governmental participation and broad national alliances. Its position in this respect was very similar to that of the PCI. Its ousting from government in 1947 drastically changed the political stance of the PCF. The consequence it drew from its withdrawal from government was quite different from that of the PCI. While the PCI kept its policy of alliances, its independent national stance and avoided isolation, the PCF gave up the policy of alliances, adhering to the Soviet model and beginning a marginalization within the French political arena.

The party had been participating in the post-war governments because of its important role in the opposition against the Germans, but it had never developed doctrinal positions adapting its revolutionary stances to its governmental position. Therefore, the PCF, unlike the PCI, had no other possibility than to keep the bolshevik model and strategy as directed by Moscow. At that time the Soviet model was the Stalinist model. Therefore, the PCF developed along Stalinist lines. For it, Stalinism first meant the creation of a "cult of personality" built around the figure of its General Secretary, Maurice Thorez. The PCF identified itself with the "Fils du Peuple", as Thorez was called. On the occasion of Thorez' fiftieth birthday, the party availed itself of the opportunity to circulate special membership forms which stated: "Dear Maurice Thorez, I wish you long life and good health on the occasion of your fiftieth birthday, I am joining the French Communist Party. I hereby join the Party of Maurice Thorez."<sup>102</sup> Jean Elleinstein has indicated the degree of unanimity among party members, including future dissidents. There was unanimity in praising Stalin and the Soviet Union:

L'Union Soviétique construisait le socialisme, défendait la paix, et la mettre un tant soit peu en question constituait une forme majeure d'hérésie. Nous étions

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<sup>101</sup> The PCF received, in the general elections of 21 October 1945, five million votes or 26% of the votes.

<sup>102</sup> M. Duverger, *Political Parties*, (London, Methuen, 1954), pp. 180–181.





tous ainsi faits, de Claude Roy à Roger Garaudy, de Pierre Daix à Annie Kriegel, de Charles Tillon à Henry Fizbin, et je n'étais point différent. Enfermés dans un univers mental manichéen, nous refusions de voir la réalité...la vérité...le culte de Staline et de l'URSS trouva une apogée dans l'extraordinaire exposition de cadeaux offerts au chef de l'URSS pour son soixante-dixième anniversaire, organisé à Ivry par le PCF.<sup>103</sup>

The PCF's love for Stalin and the Soviet Union was still so strong at the time of Stalin's death that it failed to understand and to accept Moscow's more "liberal" policy, and the significance of the de-Stalinization speech at the XXth congress of the CPSU in 1956. It certainly did not adapt itself to Moscow's move for several years. No such move as "the necessity of collective leadership" or the "criticism of the personality cult" appeared within the PCF. Only when losing hope of seeing Khrushchev quickly overthrown by more traditional elements, did it begin to try to adapt itself to Khrushchevism and to develop, after a fashion, in the Khrushchev framework, but still without giving up its tenacious passive resistance to de-Stalinization within the PCF.<sup>104</sup> One can say that the PCF was so closely linked to the Soviet Union that when there was a change of direction in the Soviet Union, the PCF was unable to follow it, although it would eventually end in following it.<sup>105</sup>

While the PCF kept close links with the Soviet Union and its model of socialism, it progressively became marginalized within the French political scene. From the time of its ousting from government, the PCF was hit by an "interdiction of power" imposed on it by the quasi-totality of the French political forces, from the Socialist SFIO to the extreme right. Until 1978, it remained an important oppositional force in numbers of seats in the Chambers; but during the whole period, it was marginalized on the fringe of the political system. Therefore, its parliamentary opposition was sterile. Internally, the party suffered from its marginal position and from its inability to rally new support. Between 1947 and 1958, it seemed doomed to a definitive decline, incapable of proposing an alternative to

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<sup>103</sup> Jean Elleinstein, Ils vous trompent, camarades, p.68.

<sup>104</sup> F. Fejto, The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1967), p.5.

<sup>105</sup> History repeats itself. Khrushchev's condemnation in 1964 and the Soviet's return to orthodoxy provoked a similar pattern of reaction within the PCF. Again, it neither understood nor accepted the Soviet move. It took its distance from Moscow and developed a strategy of "Union de la Gauche" based on cooperation with the Socialists. The move away from Moscow culminated in the 1968 condemnation of the Russian intervention in Prague and the Champigny Manifesto. But this break away from Moscow disappeared between 1968 and the 1976-1977 "Eurocommunist wave", and after 1978. From 1968 (meeting between Russian leaders and the PCF in November), the PCF came closer to the Soviet Union, denouncing the excess of liberalization of the previous leadership and reiterating its praise of the Soviet socialism in its 1971 program: changer de cap. On this period, see Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du PCF, p.571.





the Fourth Republic.<sup>106</sup>

The advent of the Fifth Republic made the decline of the PCF even worse. By the adoption of a new electoral system for the general election, uninominal with two ballots, the PCF had to pay the price of its isolation: it only obtained ten seats in the National Assembly.

In 1962, the PCF made an important decision: it decided to develop a strategy of alliances with the Socialists.<sup>107</sup> In so doing, the party hoped to break its marginalization and by the same token to achieve a good electoral score. It progressively developed a new language in order to be able to carry its new strategy. It placed its emphasis on openness, liberalization and democratization of society.<sup>108</sup> It developed many of the ideas put forward by Gramsci and Togliatti and headed its way toward what would later be called Eurocommunism.

But the "liberalization" movement lacked ground. Unlike the PCI, the PCF did not have its own philosophical figure to refer to and did not lean on Gramsci's thinking to assert its "liberalization" and its policy of alliances. The party also lacked the intellectual inspiration necessary to guide its day-to-day policies.<sup>109</sup> It did not fully integrate intellectuals into the party. It even seemed to fear their "bad influence". Francois Fejto presents very well the position of these intellectuals among the party during the sixties:

While attaching a certain importance to the presence of intellectuals in its ranks and to their recruitment as a factor of prestige for party propaganda, its leaders had just about given up the idea of establishing a strict discipline among the communist intellectuals. In exchange, these intellectuals had to abstain from any interference in actual political life, other than at the request of the party and as "ornamental elements". Under these conditions, the PCF seemed willing to tolerate henceforth rather unorthodox research, as long as the results did not extend beyond the limited circle of specialists.<sup>110</sup>

The absence in the PCF of a philosophical figure adapting Marxism to the conditions of Western Europe and the position of intellectuals within the party during the

<sup>106</sup> Jacques Fauvet discusses the diminution of the PCF's revenues, the sectarianism of the Party and its loss of control of many important local government institutions. Histoire du PCF, pp. 406-407.

<sup>107</sup> As part of this new policy, see, for example, the PCF support of the Mitterand's candidacy for the 1965 presidential elections even for the first ballot; see Tiersky, Ronald, French Communism 1920-1972, New York, Columbia University Press, 1974).

<sup>108</sup> For example, the communist proposal to the SFIO of a common democratic programm (1964) and Garaudy's "dialogue" with the Christians or giving up the ideas of establishing a strict discipline among the communist intellectuals.

<sup>109</sup> Almost since its creation, the PCF has been headed by non intellectual leaders. M. Thorez, Waldeck-Rochet and G. Marchais have worker backgrounds.

<sup>110</sup> F. Fejto, The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism, p. 119.



sixties, are two important elements that must be combined in measuring the strength of the PCF during the seventies. These elements partially explain the party's sudden move away from its Eurocommunist stance.

The PCF had, however, its Eurocommunist highlights, such as the 1968 Champigny Manifesto or the 1976–1977 wave of liberalization. These highlights will receive special attention in chapter three. Their significance will be assessed in the light of the surrounding circumstances as well as their duration.





## The PCE

Since 1945, the evolution of the PCE has been dominated by four major parameters: the illegality of the party, the Russian influence on party life, the politics of the tactics to adopt against Franco and the prominent role of Santiago Carrillo at the top of the party. Each of these parameters will be developed in the following paragraphs.

The PCE had been outlawed by Franco during the entire era of the dictatorship. It was only legalized in 1977. Franco's regime was very successful in disorganizing any attempt to coordinate activities under the PCE banner and ordered by the leadership in exile. The party never could develop a mass movement of opposition to the dictator. Only small-sized operations could be conducted by guerrillas who were badly outnumbered by the police, the civil guard and the army, which mastered the situation.<sup>111</sup> However, the PCE had more successes in its policy of infiltrating the legal trade union. This success was very obvious at the time of Franco's death when the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO), a union controlled by the PCE, emerged as the largest Spanish union. During the entire Franco period, the PCE leadership was in Paris, Prague, or Moscow, totally obedient to Moscow, at least for the first twenty years after the Second World War; but it was divided over the tactics to adopt against Franco.

Both internally (vis-à-vis the other Spanish political forces in exile) as well as externally (vis-à-vis the USSR), the PCE followed a evolution similar to that of the PCF and the PCI—at least in the first post-war years. As in the case of the PCF and PCI, it joined an alliance until 1947.<sup>112</sup> Like the PCF, and to a lesser extent than the PCI, it adulated Stalinism. However, de-Stalinization came early within the PCE, certainly earlier than within the PCF. De-Stalinization was also more fundamental, because of the entrance of young members into the Politburo—members who firmly stood for de-Stalinization and succeeded in controlling the apparatus—and also because of the personality of its major proponent, Santiago Carrillo. Those young members (Carrillo, Gallego, Semprun, Claudin), fully adopted Khrushchev's policies. They succeeded in overcoming the old guard position at the fifth congress of the party (Prague, 1954).

<sup>111</sup> See Guy Hermet, The Communists in Spain (Lexington, Saxon House, 1971), pp. 52–59.

<sup>112</sup> The PCE joined the Girol and Llopis government in exile.



In the late fifties, a controversy about the tactic to overthrow Franco developed within the party leadership. Carrillo, as well as the old guard, believed that Spain was run by a small group of Francoists who had no popular support. According to them, because of the changed social structure, Franco and his regime would be brought down in the short term as a matter of course. On the other hand, Jorge Semprun and Fernando Claudin thought that the Franco regime allowed the development of a strong and stable capitalism in Spain and that Franco's fall was not imminent. If Franco's fall was imminent, that was the moment to develop strong actions. The situation, however, was not ripe for such strong actions. In 1959, following Carrillo's and the old guard's analysis, the party called for a Huelga Nacional Pacífica (National Pacific Strike) which appeared to be a total failure. The results of this failure revealed Carrillo's dominant, if not dictatorial, position in the PCE.

Despite the position in favor of the Huelga Nacional Pacífica, Carrillo succeeded in being elected Secretary General the next year at the sixth congress (January, 1960). Still, he never accepted his misinterpretation of the Spanish situation and he never acknowledged that the Huelga Nacional Pacífica had been a failure despite pressures from Semprun and Claudin to do so. Instead, he later (1965) expelled these two. Meanwhile, he changed his own views on the Spanish situation and on the strategy the PCE should adopt in order to overthrow Franco. In this regard, he adopted Claudin's and Semprun's positions. Carrillo kept his stances for liberalization after Khrushchev's disgrace.

Carrillo was seriously disoriented by the unexpected disgrace [of Khrushchev] in October 1964. Thereafter, and until 1968, a certain ambiguity is discernible in his many references to the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the habits of 30 years of unqualified support of Moscow prevailed.... On the other, there began to emerge glimmers of independence. Feeling that he had been betrayed regarding Khrushchev, Carrillo was uneasy with the new Soviet leadership. Moreover, the PCE policy of national reconciliation required that potential allies within Spain be convinced that the party did not share the dictatorial characteristics of the CPSU. Accordingly, Carrillo began trying to establish the differences between the PCE and the CPSU.<sup>113</sup>

For these reasons, the PCE established independent stances vis-à-vis Moscow at that time. These stances have not changed fundamentally.

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<sup>113</sup> Paul Preston, The PCE's long road to Democracy, 1954-1977, in In Search of Eurocommunism, Richard Kindersley, ed., (London, MacMillan Press, 1981), p.56.





## D. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to present some historical bases of Eurocommunism. The starting point of any Western European communist party was a solid link of dependence toward Moscow and "le socialisme incarné". The parties were founded as Bolshevik parties and remained Bolshevik throughout the second quarter of the century.

The popular fronts' experiences did not radically change the doctrine nor the internal life of the parties. The change that the popular front made was a tactical change in the way the parties should act in their dealings with the Socialists. First, the parties of the Left had a positive attitude vis-à-vis the members of the socialist parties. Second, the strategies of the communist parties changed from a direct and violent opposition against the socialist parties to collaboration. The popular front was the first experience of political alliance between Socialists and Communists. There is no foundation for asserting that the Communists fully accepted political pluralism and not even for saying that they were preoccupied with reaching an hegemonic position in the civil society prior to revolution. The goal of the communist strategy at that time was to destroy capitalism, almost at any cost. It has been contended that the popular fronts represented neither a doctrinal nor a practical move from "bolshevism".

In contrast, the political philosophy of Antonio Gramsci and the practical implementation of his philosophy – Togliatti's *terza via* – represent doctrinal and practical foundations of an original Marxism which have been sources of the Eurocommunist movement. Gramsci and Togliatti distinguished between civil and political society. They stressed the necessity for a mass party to reach hegemony in the civil society prior to any socialist revolution and nationalized communism. Nevertheless, and this is the important point, neither of them explicitly accepted political pluralism or the democratic alternation in governmental position. Gramsci is unclear in this regard and Togliatti's speeches hardly touched the subject of political pluralism.

Nobody in the PCE nor in the PCF developed a doctrinal position similar to Gramsci's writings. The evolution of these parties toward an original way is therefore less





definite before the seventies. However, the PCE clashed with the Soviets in the mid-sixties and the PCF emphasized openness, liberalization and democratization. By the late sixties, the PCF and the PCE did not as yet present an original type of communism. In these parties, the developments of a new form of communism only took place in the seventies.

Whatever the alliances with the Socialists in the popular fronts, the communist parties remained primarily communist while supporting the popular fronts. They continued to be revolutionary parties, the final aim of which did not adapt to the changes of the environment. Revolution remained the priority. The communist parties were more revolutionary organizations working at the eventual triumph of the proletariat than political parties wanting to fulfill any governmental role.

Methodologically, this conclusion has been reached satisfactorily without using a rigorous scientific approach because, although during the popular fronts the parties moved toward accepting the political game and although Gramsci and Togliatti advocated another type of communism, the extent of these changes, which a more scientific approach could have analyzed, is of little importance for our purpose because the doctrine of the parties did not fundamentally change. The communist parties during the popular fronts did not overtly advocate liberal democracy. In order to see if the parties changed from bolshevism toward communism with a human face, it does not really matter to know how much did they accept the political game if they did not fully advocate liberal democracy. The first two sub-sections of the next chapter will present the doctrine of the PCF and PCE and an account of the internal life of all three parties.



### III. Eurocommunism in the Spanish, Italian and French Communist Parties

In the mid-seventies, press and political commentators began using the concept of Eurocommunism and widely referring to it. At that time, it seemed that the French, the Spanish and Italian communist parties' evolution toward autonomy from Moscow and its Soviet model of communism was sufficiently similar to be globally referred to as Eurocommunism. The three parties competed in order collectively to assert their positions in joint declarations.<sup>114</sup>

In these joint declarations, the PCE, PCI and PCF put a special emphasis on the "democratic road to socialism", the pluralistic and new kind of society they wanted to develop, and the political accommodations with other popular forces of broad political alliances:

All the freedoms which are a product both of the great democratic bourgeois revolutions and of the great popular struggles of this century, headed by the working class will have to be guaranteed and developed. This holds true for freedom of thought and expression, for freedom of the press, of assembly, association and demonstration, for free movement of persons inside and outside their country, for the inviolability of private life, for religious freedom and total freedom of expression for currents of thought and every philosophical, cultural and artistic opinion. [We] declare [ourselves] for the plurality of political parties, for the right to existence and activity of opposition parties, for the free formation of majorities and minorities and the possibility of their alternating democratically, for the lay nature and democratic functioning of the state, for independence of judiciary.<sup>115</sup>

It is imperative to the completion of a thoroughly responsible investigation of points of convergence and agreement with all the political forces, that one considers the organized political influences, socialist, social democrat, Christian democrat, Catholic, democratic and progressive which are willing to take action to ensure that Western Europe's great democratic potential finds a field of understanding in a policy of renewal and progress.<sup>116</sup>

They also insisted on the fact that Eurocommunism "is not a tactical attitude but a strategic conviction born of reflection on all the experiences of the labour movement and on the

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<sup>114</sup> 1. PCI-PCE meeting at Leghorn, July 12, 1975. 2. PCI-PCF meeting at Paris, November 15, 1975. 3. Eurocommunist summit conference, Madrid, March 2, 1977. The joint declarations made after the first two meetings can be found in Paolo Filo della Torre and al, Eurocommunism, myth or reality, pp.330-338. In addition to these 'specifically eurocommunist' standpoints, the three parties have adopted similar standpoints at the Berlin conference of the European communist parties and the General Secretary of the PCI spoke at the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution on behalf of the PCI, PCE and PCF. See Le Monde, November 4, 1977.

<sup>115</sup> Joint Declaration of the French and Italian Communist Parties, November 15, 1975.

<sup>116</sup> Joint Declaration of the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties, July 12, 1975.





specific historical conditions of each country in the Western European contest."<sup>117</sup>

In order both to deepen the presentation of Eurocommunism and to see the diverging points between the parties behind the general and somewhat vague declarations, each communist party will be analyzed in two steps. First, the official Eurocommunist 'doctrine' of each party as put forward by their leaders will receive attention. For the PCI, this was done in the last chapter. Second, an assessment of each party's internal life will be undertaken. A separate section will discuss the presence of the three parties on their respective national scene.

It will be seen that the PCI is the strongest and most stable advocate of Eurocommunism because of its long 'pluralistic' position. The PCE has gone the farthest in its commitment to Eurocommunism. Its well-entrenched position for a democratic way to socialism is, however, contested within its ranks. The PCF lies far behind the two others both in terms of theoretical assessment of Eurocommunism and day-to-day political life. One may say that the PCF did not even officially develop the concept of Eurocommunism as an official global doctrine. For example, Jean Elleinstein argues that the PCF never fully endorsed Eurocommunism as its own ideology.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Jean Elleinstein, Ils vous trompent, camarades, p.23.



## A. The PCF

### Doctrine

An analysis of PCF doctrine might begin with a look at the publications of its General Secretary, Georges Marchais. These publications have been numerous for the last ten years.<sup>119</sup> Unfortunately, there is no clear doctrinal position in any of Marchais' books. His writings are polemical speeches rather than doctrinal thought. But because of the prominence of Marchais, the content of these books must be examined here.

Attention is focused on two of Georges Marchais' books: the first, "Parlons franchement", published in 1977, which appeared at the end of the Eurocommunist wave, and the second, "L'espoir au présent", published in 1980. These two books do not present any significant difference in content except that the latter book is far more pro-Soviet than the former. Therefore, with the exception of the "Russian question", they are analyzed together.

In his analysis of the actual French society, Georges Marchais is particularly polemical. He accuses much more than he proposes. His targets are easily identified: "les patrons, les monopolistes, les maitres de la France, les societes multinationales et plus generalement les riches."<sup>120</sup> These targets form a small minority who holds power against the immense majority of the French people. Exploitation by a small minority is the reality of capitalism. Consequently, the capitalist state is essentially an instrument of domination devoted to the exploitation of the majority by a small minority. The state is, therefore, in direct contradiction to the masses.

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<sup>119</sup> Among others, Qu'est-ce que le parti communiste français (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1970); Le défi démocratique (Paris, Grasset, 1978); La politique du parti communiste français (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1974), Parlons franchement (Paris, Grasset, 1977); L'Espoir au présent (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1980).

<sup>120</sup> G. Marchais, (1977), p.25.





On the question of liberties,<sup>121</sup> the PCF Secretary General describes the French society as one lacking basic liberties because there is no social justice in France.<sup>122</sup> "La liberté ne peut pas être ce ne doit pas être seulement le droit de 'rouspéter' en prenant son café crème."<sup>123</sup> But liberty or the liberties are not positively defined. Georges Marchais' comparison of the Eastern and Western worlds may give us a clearer conception of what he means by "liberties":

Oui, mais la démocratie, la liberté? Je pourrais répondre en reprenant tout ce que je viens d'évoquer. Qu'est-ce, en effet, que la liberté...sans travail, sans toit, sans métier? Mais parlons des libertés de parler, d'agir, de décider. Il y en a eut, c'est vrai des erreurs tragiques (à l'Est). Il y a, c'est vrai des insuffisances, des fautes.

Mais le socialisme a-t-il permis un développement de la démocratie dans ses différentes dimensions? A-t-il permis un progrès dans la capacité des individus, du peuple, de prendre leur place dans la vie nationale, de réaliser leurs aspirations, d'intervenir dans tout ce qui les concerne? Oui, certainement oui.<sup>124</sup>

This conception of liberties is far from that of liberal democracy, and is rather, a total acquiescence of popular democracy.

What then is meant by the Eurocommunism of the PCF? In L'Eurocommunisme aujourd'hui et demain,<sup>125</sup> Marchais acknowledges the independent existence of a communist party in relations with the others and, more precisely, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. But he never delineates the substantive matter of Eurocommunism.

Finally, what is Marchais' approach to revolution? "Le mot 'revolution' a une signification precise. Il veut dire: changement de societe, remplacement d'une societe depassee par une societe meilleure, plus humaine."<sup>126</sup> The revolutionary changes can only result from majoritarian movements involving societal unrest and "les luttes". They will result from a class struggle led by the working class. Millions of exploited wage earners compose this working class, the only class capable of gathering "all the popular forces to make, two hundred years later, the second French revolution, more important than the

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<sup>121</sup> A. Harris and Alain Sedouy note that the PCF does not speak of liberty, but of liberties (la liberte et les libertes). This difference in phraseology directly indicates that the word has a totally different meaning for the PCF than the majority of Westerners. As Harris and Sedouy argue: "Il n'y a pas UNE mais DES libertes et la premiere de ces libertes, c'est la liberte économique, résultant de la disparition de la propriété privée des moyens de production et d'échanges." A. Harris and A. Sedouy, Voyage à l'intérieur du parti communiste (Paris, Seuil, 1974).

<sup>122</sup> G. Marchais (1981), p. 85.

<sup>123</sup> G. Marchais (1981), p. 81.

<sup>124</sup> G. Marchais (1981), p. 38.

<sup>125</sup> G. Marchais (1980), pp. 136–139.

<sup>126</sup> G. Marchais (1980), p. 117.





precedent: the socialist revolution."<sup>127</sup> Grandiloquence and vagueness about the goals to reach characterize Marchais' conception of revolution. On this subject, once again, the leader of the PCF disappoints anyone who would like to find in his writings a theoretical answer to problems facing a communist party in contemporary Western Europe. Georges Marchais does not present a clear positive notion of pluralism, liberty, the State and the socialist revolution. That the General Secretary's publications are not doctrinal is already indicative of a certain position of the party vis-à-vis doctrine, a certain fuzziness which will appear more clearly in the following paragraphs.

If the General Secretary does not present a satisfactory answer to the question: What is the PCF's doctrine? one must look elsewhere. One way of doing this is by following the party's major official doctrinal positions on Eurocommunism. It will be demonstrated that many of these have been Eurocommunist in substance. However, attention will be focused on their partial character and on the permanence of a traditional anti-Eurocommunist trend. Therefore, this trend will also be presented. It will be seen that, although not publicly avowed, this trend is shown in the dominant doctrine of the PCF.

Neither the party collectively nor a leader ever developed a Eurocommunist doctrine as Carrillo did in his Eurocommunism and the State.<sup>128</sup>

The PCF, however, took steps away from traditional communism. These steps are in many aspects similar to Carrillo's Eurocommunism. It is the purpose of the following paragraphs to present some of the major Eurocommunist stands of the PCF: the Champigny Manifesto, the XXII congress of the party and the Eurocommunist meetings.

If some Eurocommunist stands were present in the party during the sixties, there was no text of reference before the adoption (September, 1968) of the Champigny Manifesto: "Pour une démocratie avancée, pour une France socialiste." This Champigny Manifesto must be linked, first, to the May, 1968 events and so be understood as a reaction to the party's poor record of militancy during the course of these events. Indeed, the PCF did not understand what was going on in May. It only realized the importance of

<sup>127</sup> G. Marchais (1980), p. 125.

<sup>128</sup> To the author's knowledge, the only members who publicly advocated a Eurocommunist doctrine of the PCF were forced to quit the party or they lost their position because of their "doctrinal deviation": such is the case of Jean Elleinstein, former director of the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche Marxiste; Roger Garaudy, former member of the Central Committee; and Raymond Jean, author of La singularité d'être communiste. Jean Rony was not excommunicated: the party just kept a total silence on his work -Trente ans de parti un communiste s'interroge.



the conflict when it was too late. There was a gap between the 1968 leaders (Cohn-Bendit, Geismar and so on ) and the PCF. The party was condemning the former as "naive gauchist". It also contended that the movement was not backed by the masses. Only when the movement extended to the factories, did the PCF follow the contenders. Those events showed that the PCF was not, as it claimed, at the forefront of the popular movement. It had been overtaken by the masses. A reaction had to develop. This came in the form of a doctrinal reappraisal – the Champigny Manifesto.

This Manifesto is first of all an important change of the party vocabulary. In the Champigny Manifesto, the party first advocated "la démocratie avancée" or advanced democracy. This concept means that for the PCF, the way to socialism goes through the development of "liberal" democracy. Forgetting its previous vocabulary and denying any value to "capitalist democracy", the party argued that liberal democracy was no longer antagonistic to socialism, but that it was the essence of it. For the PCF, the Left, coming to power, would have to respect democracy in a transitory period to socialism.

The Champigny Manifesto is also important because it represents the first acceptance by the PCF of party pluralism. In this Manifesto, the PCF advocates party pluralism at least during the transitory period to socialism. Nevertheless, the Manifesto puts stress on the leading role and on the predominant influence which the PCF pretends to exert in the transformation of French society to socialism.<sup>129</sup>

A second important "Eurocommunist" moment for the PCF was the adoption of several "liberal" resolutions in its XXII<sup>nd</sup> congress (February 1976). This congress heavily supported a pluralist and democratic form of socialism. The most spectacular move in the congress was the deletion of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", saying that it no longer expressed the French communist conception of political power in either the transition phase of "advanced democracy" or in socialism itself. The XXII<sup>nd</sup> congress also severely criticized the Soviet Union. In a report to the Central Committee at the time of the congress, the Soviet Union "[fut reprochée] "de soutenir Giscard d'Estaing contre l'Union de la Gauche, d'oublier l'existence de la lutte des classes et de pratiquer à l'intérieur du pays et dans ses rapports avec les autres états socialistes une politique anti-démocratique

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<sup>129</sup> The text of the Champigny Manifesto can be found in Cahiers du communisme, January, 1969. See also Dominique Labbe, Le discours communiste (Paris, FNSP, 1977), pp. 160–175.







en contradiction avec l'idéal communiste dont [le PCF] se réclame."<sup>130</sup>

The participation of the PCF in Eurocommunist meetings constituted other opportunities for the PCF to express Eurocommunist stances. Suffice it here to recall the November 15, 1975 French and Italian communist parties' meeting and the 1977 Madrid Conference. To those meetings, one can add the June, 1976 Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties in East Berlin, where the PCF's attitude was very similar to that of the PCI and PCE.

But as Elleinstein shows, the PCF did not develop a global Eurocommunist doctrine because "une fraction importante de la direction et du parti y était hostile, [fraction] qui a freiné au maximum l'essor de ce mouvement historique nouveau."<sup>131</sup> Moreover, from 1977 on, the party pursued its distance from the Eurocommunist doctrine. Although the XXII<sup>nd</sup> congress (May 1979) continued to speak of a "democratic advance to socialism", the PCF did not participate in any "Eurocommunist" party gathering after 1977, and among the other parties, the PCI and the PCE did not send any representative to the 28–29 April 1980 conference for peace and disarmament hosted by the PCF and the Polish communist party in Paris. The PCF also strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union. For example, it did not, unlike the PCI and the PCE, condemn the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.<sup>132</sup> "Scientific socialism" and historical necessity of the leadership role of the working class, of which the PCF is "the vanguard", was particularly emphasized during the XXII<sup>nd</sup> congress.

If both the General Secretary and the PCF official statements were far from providing a doctrine for the PCF, one must look elsewhere to find a more global doctrine. Respectable sources for this can be found in the writings of authors who have a clear idea of what the PCF doctrine is: the late philosopher Louis Althusser, his protege Etienne Balibar, as well as Gerard Molina and Yves Vargas. It must be noted at the outset that none of these intellectuals holds a position in the leadership of the PCF and that they are all critical of some of the PCF policies. For example, they strongly criticize the

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<sup>130</sup> Jean Elleinstein, *Ils vous trompent camarades*, p. 33. Further developments and the text of the reports of the XXII<sup>nd</sup> congress can be found in *Cahiers du communisme*, March, 1976.

<sup>131</sup> Jean Elleinstein, *Ils vous trompent, camarades*, p. 35.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45–71, speaks of "du virage à l'Est" of the PCF. On December 13, Marchais accused (Enrico Berlinguer) the Italian communist leader of participating in a campaign of intoxication against "the Socialist camp", on the subject of Poland. *Yearbook of International Communist Affairs*, 1981, p. 387.



bureaucratization of democratic centralism within the PCF. However, they express what one could call, with a gross simplification, a traditional Marxist view of a communist party.<sup>133</sup>

In their analysis of the liberal capitalist state, the social revolution and the role of the party, Gerard Molina and Yves Vargas develop traditional ideas on what the PCF doctrine should be.

In contrast to Carrillo, for whom liberal democracy possesses true features of socialism, Molina and Vargas blatantly condemn liberal democracy because it creates exploitation of the many by the few. For them, dictatorship or liberal democracy are two faces of the same type of exploitation:

Alors toute démocratie est déjà un élément de socialisme, un germe de collectivisation des forces productives, un pas vers le pouvoir de la classe ouvrière? Alors, quand on passe du régime des colonels à Caramanlis, on fait un pas vers le socialisme? Mais non: on reste dans le capitalisme, en plein dedans: car le capitalisme a plusieurs fers au feu, et de la dictature la plus odieuse à la démocratie la plus libérale, c'est toujours la classe bourgeoise et les monopoles qui tiennent le pouvoir.<sup>134</sup>

There is a contradiction between "l'Etat" and "les masses". This new view of the State as totally unrepresentative of the masses is a common view within the PCF. Georges Marchais' "anti-discours", as well as other official publications, stress this contradiction.

Molina and Vargas are unclear with regard to the debate on whether or not liberal democracy is respected by the communists. They draw a distinction between party and society. For them, two kinds of democracy must exist: the one in which the party is based on democratic centralism and the other, that of the society which must be based on liberal democracy until the withering away of the State:

Aussi pour que notre position soit crédible, il faudrait que les communistes soient en mesure d'expliquer aux Français la différence qui existe entre l'Etat et le parti.<sup>135</sup>

One naturally arrives at the authors' conception of the revolution and the party.

The path leading to revolution is simple: a class struggle led by the working class,<sup>136</sup>

<sup>133</sup> To be more precise, two groups essentially compose this "traditional" trend: Louis Althusser and his most outspoken disciple Etienne Balibar, and Yves Vargas and Gerard Molina. The former tend to be more orthodox than the latter, but both claim to relate their doctrinal ideas on a "true" group reading of Marx's "scientific socialism." This resemblance leads the author to classify them. In fact, the following paragraphs concentrate on the doctrinal positions of Yves Vargas and Gerard Molina as described in Dialogue à l'intérieur du PCF (Paris, Maspero, 1978).

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., pp. 118–119.

<sup>136</sup> According to the authors, this is in direct opposition to the Eurocommunist "démocratie





"et sous la forme d'une organisation structurée –le parti–",<sup>137</sup> the only "true" proponent of scientific socialism.

The preceding positions, held by a fair amount of intellectuals within the party, have not received official support; but their authors have not been publicly criticized as have been the strong proponents of "Eurocommunism." Moreover, all the elements showing the decline of Eurocommunist stances are as numerous as elements increasing the influence of traditional communist doctrine. Indeed, in the absence of a valuable alternative and, in the writer's opinion, Marchais' liberal declarations, as well as the liberal 24th congress (which did not represent a global alternative), traditional doctrine must prevail and with time it overrides any partial tendency to modernize the official doctrine. That leads us to the conclusion that the Eurocommunist doctrinal trend is far from being the official doctrine of the PCF. Its doctrine is rather more traditional. The PCF has Eurocommunist tendencies but it does not condemn its Marxist–Leninist tradition which, in the absence of a global alternative, must be considered as dominant doctrine. Perhaps, as Annie Kriegel has written, regarding the PCF, this is due to the position of the PCF on the political scene.

[Le PCF] est barre [sur sa droite] par toutes les variétés de socialisme démocratique et [sur sa gauche] par la prolifération de groupes gauchistes, marxistes, neomarxistes ou anarchistes. [Il] ne dispose pas d'un espace politique où il [pourrait] être autre chose que ce qu'il a toujours été.<sup>138</sup>

### Internal life of the party

Compared to the PCI and PCE, the PCF stands out in its application of democratic centralism. Though there are different streams of ideas within the party, its organization is rigidly monolithic.

There is no communist movement organized on a regional or an ideological basis outside the party's structure. All PCF members must belong to one of the following

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<sup>136</sup>(cont'd)jusqu'au bout", p. 119, as much as the capitalist state is in contradiction with the masses.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>138</sup> Annie Kriegel, "L'Eurocommunisme", *Projet*, 113, 1977, p. 270.



organs and cannot be linked to any other political organization without risking exclusion: the cell, the section, the federation, the central committee, the political bureau and the secretariat. The cell is the basic organ which is supposed to collaborate with party policy and put it into practice. Each cell elects a section committee which elects a federal committee. This in turn elects the central committee. This body is the organ making decisions between two congresses. It has about one hundred and twenty members and meets three to ten times a year. Between congresses, the political bureau, of only twenty members, makes the principal decisions. It meets weekly and the day-to-day policies are decided by the five- or six-member Secretariat.<sup>139</sup>

The whole structure is thus moved by the top rather than by the bottom through the application of democratic centralism. Jean Elleinstein sums up the criticisms in this regard:

Le Comité central, c'est-à-dire l'organisme dirigeant du Parti, a seul le droit de soumettre des textes pour la préparation d'un congrès, et entre les congrès il décide souverainement de l'action à mener et de la façon d'appliquer la politique du Parti. L'élection des directions inférieures est soumise à son contrôle. Pour être élu à un poste de responsabilités dans une fédération, il faut avoir l'accord du représentant du Comité central, du Secrétariat du Comité central et du responsable de la section des Cadres. En apparence, les processus démocratiques sont respectés, mais en apparence seulement. Chaque adhérent dans sa cellule peut donner son avis. Mais si la discussion est verticale du Comité central à la cellule, ou à la limite de la cellule au Comité central, elle n'a pas le droit d'être horizontale d'une cellule à l'autre à l'intérieur d'une section, d'une section à l'autre à l'intérieur d'une fédération, d'une fédération à l'autre dans le pays. En somme, le Comité central et plus encore, le Bureau politique, et plus encore le Secrétariat du Comité central, ont un monopole dans le choix des thèmes soumis à la discussion, dans le processus de prise de décision, dans leur application et enfin dans la désignation des directions inférieures et des délégués aux congrès.<sup>140</sup>

Moreover, important changes in policy have recently been decided with no discussion, for example, the decision to abandon the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat announced by Marchais in a radio interview and voted by a unanimous party congress a month later. Another was the decision to support continued development of France's nuclear strike force, taken by the central committee in May, 1977, virtually without debate after hearing a single report from a politburo member, Jean Kanapa.

The most recent attempt to shake the monolithic party structure was made by Henry Fizbin of the Paris' federation. His problems with the party have revealed both the

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<sup>139</sup> This structure is similar to the PCE and PCI's structures. Therefore, it will not be repeated unless there is a significant difference.

<sup>140</sup> Jean Elleinstein, Ils vous trompent, camarades!, p. 114.





tight mechanisms of control from the top and the consequences which may result if this control is put into question. Fizbin's ideas diverged on several accounts from those of the party, but his criticisms were mainly centered on the absence of horizontal discussions and on the imposition of directives from the top on the cell. He openly raised his voice and was suspended from his functions in the Central Committee and in his departmental federation. When he and some followers edited an independent monthly journal, the party reacted by expelling the opponents for lack of discipline. Unlike the PCE and the PCI, the PCF controls everything within the party. When it cannot control any longer, it expels.

There are still unexplained silences on changes of tactics and the removals of personalities from high positions. During the twenty-third congress, Roland Leroy was "removed" from the Secretariat to which he had acceded in 1961.<sup>141</sup> This removal did not lead to any discussion, although the congress expressed the need for better information and a more real share of responsibilities.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Le Monde, May 13, 1983.

<sup>142</sup> "Le 23ème congrès du PCF: ne pas choisir." Colette Ysmal, Projet, 137, 1979, p. 830. For a philosophical account of the PCF's lack of democracy, see Cornelius Castoriadis, "L'évolution du PCF," Esprit, Dec., 1977, p. 41.



## B. The PCI

### Internal life

As it is for the PCF and the PCE, democratic centralism is central in the life of the PCI.<sup>143</sup> The principle of democratic centralism was reaffirmed by Berlinguer at the end of the last party congress (March 1983) as the technique of organization of the party, devoid of any ideological content. Berlinguer argued: "Il ne s'agit pas d'une connotation idéologique, mais d'une forme de vie interne au parti."<sup>144</sup>

But the internal democracy of the party is often questioned both by its members and by political analysts. It is very often asserted that the leadership imposes its views on the party base. These criticisms are neither unique nor new to the PCI. The interesting question is: what is the degree of freedom of discussion and what is the real weight of the base in decision making?

The PCI has replaced the cell structure with constituency-sized units.<sup>145</sup> This replacement has resulted in more openness and tolerance at the base level. Although and perhaps because the transparency of the debate is still questioned, a more authentic debate exists.<sup>146</sup> A recent example of an authentic debate has been the discussion on the assessment of the Soviet Union's policies. Although the last congress had by a majority expressed harsh criticism of the Eastern Bloc, Armando Cossuta, the party's leading pro-Soviet figure, submitted an amendment praising Soviet socialism.<sup>147</sup> Such a divergent position from the party line would not be permitted in the PCF.

It is certain that the leadership must take into consideration the points of view of the base in order to avoid harsh criticism. However, the base can be manouvered and is led in one direction no matter what divergencies it may have with the top because of the

<sup>143</sup> The doctrine of the PCI has been analyzed in chapter two under "In search for Autonomy".

<sup>144</sup> Le Monde, March 8, 1983.

<sup>145</sup> Neil McInnes, "From Cominterm to Polycentrism", in Eurocommunism, Myth or Reality, Paolo Filo della Torre, Edward Mortimer and Jonathan Story, eds., p. 55.

<sup>146</sup> See Le Monde, March 4, 1983.

<sup>147</sup> The text of the amendment was: "We believe the conditions exist to inject vigour into the thrust which flowed out of the October revolution." Le Monde, March 8, 1983.





obsession with unity and the centralized structure of decision making.<sup>148</sup> It should be noted that the organizational structure of the PCI is based on second-degree elections. The constituency-sized units elect the members of the federation which, in turn, elects the members of the central committee. This process works like a filter allowing the leadership to master opposition.

Contrary to the PCE, no organization exists within the PCI although there are trends like the pro-Soviet trend led by Cossutta, the right trend led by Napolitano and the left trend led by Ingrao. These trends do not have a structural organization and do not publish an independent periodical.

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<sup>148</sup> This is the view of Franco Ferrarotti, "The Italian Communist Party and Eurocommunism," in The Many Faces of Eurocommunism, Morton A. Kaplan, ed. (New York, Free Press, 1978), p. 59.



## C. The PCE

### Doctrine

The PCE is the Western European communist party which has gone the farthest in autonomous paths from Moscow and the Soviet model of communism by its rejection of Leninism and by its criticism of the Soviet Union up to denying its socialist character.<sup>149</sup> Because it is the only attempt by a communist party official to develop Eurocommunist stands in a book, Santiago Carrillo's Eurocommunism and the State deserves special attention. His book will be used as the foremost source in the following analysis.<sup>150</sup>

From a reading of his book, one can say that the doctrinal foundations of Santiago Carrillo are directly oriented toward the practice of his own party. In his book, he analyzes first the environment facing the PCE, that is, the Spanish capitalist state in the seventies. Second, it shows the best way to bring about socialism within this state. Along these lines, he discusses socialism, democracy and pluralism. However, these concepts remain undefined by him. He does not discuss the goals of socialism and democracy.

Carrillo sees the Spanish capitalist state as a well developed structure of power relations which has a strong mediating role in society and concrete links with its ideological supports (e.g. the Church and the Universities). Therefore, he totally refuses to analyze the state which, in his view, only represents a dominating supreme coercive power.<sup>151</sup> For Carrillo, the Spanish state of today is involved in economic life: it has developed an important civil service and many social programs which have increased its influence in society.

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<sup>149</sup> Carrillo's critical attitude vis-à-vis the USSR is analyzed in chapter three. It should be noted that the PCE was only legalized in 1977, on the eve of the first post-Franco general elections. Its long absence from the political scene makes the evaluation of its autonomous paths more difficult than that of the PCF and PCI.

<sup>150</sup> Santiago Carrillo has been General Secretary of the PCE between the years of 1953 and 1982. As it will be seen later, he had a prominent role in the moulding of the PCE doctrine and although there have been some attacks on it, Santiago Carrillo's Eurocommunist stance has never been abandoned.

<sup>151</sup> Carrillo refers here to Lenin's view of the State as developed in What is to be Done (1902).





For Carrillo, as for Gramsci, the nature of the state determines the nature and direction of the socialist revolutionary struggle. The PCE General Secretary also rejects Lenin's communist strategy of destroying the state apparatus and creating a new power outside it. The state should rather be conquered from the inside,<sup>152</sup> because if the productive forces are not sufficiently developed in the directions of the political or revolutionary change, the "socialist" relations of production could become purely formal with all the consequences that this formal character could bring in "destabilizing" the new apparatus.

Still, according to Carrillo, the actual development of the Spanish state moves in a socialist direction. The state becomes more and more democratic. It has granted universal suffrage and some economic rights to the working class. The Spanish state also has liberalized itself by granting religious freedom and securing human rights. These developments should be considered as truly socialist acquisitions, because communism, says Carrillo, is in essence democratic. The development of capitalism therefore carries with it socialism.<sup>153</sup>

Because the Spanish capitalist state has developed both its own strong structure and some features of socialism, one must not, according to Carrillo, destroy it by violence, but rather change its nature:

We are convinced that with democracy the road can be opened up to a new model of socialism which will maintain and increase liberties, without refusing them to an opposition prepared to wage the struggle of the ballot base, and its representative institutions.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Note that the Chilean experience of taking over the state power without securing a broad range of support within the society –what Gramsci would call civil society– certainly influences Carrillo's reflections.

<sup>153</sup> That democracy would be the essence of communism, nobody has rejected. But, what kind of democracy are we talking about? The word "democracy" is used here by Carrillo in a very ambiguous way. For Marx, democracy was the essence of communism, not socialism; that is, democracy comes at the final stage of revolution. Carrillo perhaps does not understand it in this way and uses it in its bourgeois sense. This interpretation obviously seems the only accurate one in the following expression: "democratic road to socialism" (e.g. p. 77). The other interpretation prevails in the following passage: "Under communism, democracy understood as meaning the active participation of all in the administration of society, will continue to be an indispensable treasure, or rather will achieve its fullest and most complete realisation." (p. 146). The switch from one interpretation to another should be mentioned and explained. Carrillo never mentions it. That pluralism is the essence of communism is also questionable in the absence of explanations. Really, why is it so? The switch between the two conceptions of democracy and the absence of theoretical foundations of the Eurocommunist pluralism leads the writer to adopt in this matter a very circumspect attitude. The reader should refer to the discussion on Gramsci's acceptance of pluralism and democracy.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.



Il s'agit pour commencer, d'une succession de ruptures qui vont culminer dans un changement qualitatif au moment où l'appareil d'Etat s'identifiera avec le socialisme.<sup>155</sup>

According to Carrillo, revolution therefore does not imply the extinction of a political order and the establishment of another one. Rather, revolution is brought about by structural or fundamental reforms which, by their own characteristics, change the nature of the state. Carrillo is very vague on these structural reforms. Among these, one can cite decentralization of the state, nationalization of key sectors of the economy, direct democracy and self-management in the enterprises.

Carrillo also develops the idea of a new political formation comparable to that of a hegemonic bloc defined by Gramsci.<sup>156</sup> The new formation "would not be a super-party, since each would preserve, in the final analysis, their own freedom of action, nor would it be a merely electoral or transient coalition; it would be inspired by a desire to continue its existence in order to realize common ideals."<sup>157</sup> Indeed, this alliance would have the aim, on the basis of a common minimum socialist and democratic program, to reverse the ideological support of the masses actually directed to capitalism. One may wonder as to what in these points represent practical political analysis as opposed to pure political fiction and dreams. What is the common program or even, what is socialism? These questions do not receive an answer in Carrillo's book and it is doubtful that the parties which could rally to the alliance are convinced to do so by Carrillo's arguments. Carrillo proposes an alliance in idealistic terms, but he neither defines the terms nor the goals of this alliance.

The party is also of great concern for Carrillo. The PCE is viewed by him as a vanguard party, "in as much as it truly embodies a creative Marxist attitude."<sup>158</sup> But the party is "no longer the only representative of the working class."<sup>159</sup> Yet,

the party does not set itself the aim of becoming the dominant force in the state of society or of imposing its ideology on them on an official footing. The party's mission is to contribute toward ensuring that the forces of labour and culture win political and social hegemony. With this aim, the party does not aspire to win power as a monopoly for itself, but aspire to a power in which the different political groups representing these forces take part and

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<sup>155</sup> Santiago Carrillo, Demain l'Espagne (Paris, Seuil, 1974), p. 198.

<sup>156</sup> In PCE official terms, this new political formation is simply called: "the alliances of the forces of labour and culture". See Manuel Azcarate, "The Present State of Eurocommunism", p. 30.

<sup>157</sup> Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, p. 102.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.





cooperate, according to their real weight, in emulation for progress, socialism and democracy.<sup>160</sup>

In summary, Carrillo's conceptions of Eurocommunism as a democratic way to socialism is developed through the analysis of the state and the importance of civil society. Carrillo's commitments to pluralism and bourgeois values (and possibly also to socialist values) such as human rights, parliamentary life or democratic alternation, are rather clear, even if they do not have theoretical foundations. Yet, Carrillo's position on democracy as a final stage of politics is more nebulous and, finally, socialism is not questioned. Carrillo only gives us some hints of what socialism could be when he writes that the capitalist state moves more and more toward socialism and when he explains the structural reforms which will bring socialism. In these two cases, socialism appears as an ameliorated form of a social capitalism. Of course, Carrillo never advocates that. But does he really think that socialism is "only" that?

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid.



## Internal life of the PCE

Like the PCF and the PCI, the PCE advocated democratic centralism. The PCE declared that democratic centralism is fully democratic, rejecting the fact that it automatically breeds bureaucratic and authoritarian tendencies. It made a distinction between democratic and bureaucratic centralism. By doing so, it acknowledged that democratic centralism has served to cover defects in the life of communist parties, but that these defects were only produced by the bureaucratic deviation of democratic centralism.<sup>161</sup> Therefore, rather than rejecting the principle of democratic centralism, the PCE wished to free itself from some elements which have been conducive to bureaucratic deformations, because, according to the PCE, democratic centralism is by nature democratic.

Democratic centralism does not permit the existence of factions within the party. This prohibition is recalled at different places by Carrillo and Azcarate.<sup>162</sup> According to them, the existence of factions ruins the work of the party. The party members are free to discuss as long as they do not organize in an oppositional body. The party must be the sole political representative body and must speak one language only. But the practice of the PCE is very far from these organizational principles. First of all, the party has regional wings: the Galician, the Basque and the Catalan wings.<sup>163</sup> Second, strong factional opposition to the PCE official line developed within its Catalan wing –the PSUC– without leading to the expulsion of the dissidents.

Spain contains various nationalities. The PCE recognizes these and fully commits its organization to party decentralization. Yet, the principle of decentralization is regarded by the PCE leaders as "a question of creating a living democracy –a democracy in which effective power will reside in the organs of popular power so that the viability of that power is such that no group installed in the central zone of power could wipe it out at a

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<sup>161</sup> Carrillo's criticism of the Soviet Union are partly based on his perception of the Soviet Union as developing a bureaucratic centralism.

<sup>162</sup> At its IXth Congress, the PCE asserted: "The principle of democratic centralism to which we adhere,... will help internal democracy." (XVth thesis of the resolution of the IXth Congress.) Manuel Azcarate, "The Present State of Eurocommunism", p. 32.

<sup>163</sup> Galician Communist Party, Basque Communist Party and PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya).





blow."<sup>164</sup>

The different regional wings hold congresses and elect their representatives to the national party. Because of their electoral weakness, the Galician and the Basque parties do not have a significant importance within the PCE. On the other hand, the PSUC is more than influential within the PCE: the PSUC had nine out of twenty-two PCE members of the Cortes who were Catalans. By itself, the Catalan regional aspiration certainly prevents the formation of a monolithic PCE.

But the PSUC represents more than a regionally distinct component within the PCE. Within the entire party, it introduces elements of structural pluralism because its own structure is more pluralistic than that of the PCE as a whole. Indeed, the PSUC was composed of at least three highly discernible ideological streams until 1980, when one of them split in two and its members joined the other two. On the side of Carrillo's line stood and still stand the Banderas Blancas (white flags), which refuse to place emphasis on the class struggle or on polarization politics. On the left stand the Historicos which only accepted, by discipline, a Eurocommunism retaining as much Leninism as possible. The third group which could be called "Eurocommunist", rendered sporadic but solid support to Carrillo until its split in 1980.

It is of great interest to note that, since 1980, the majority of the PSUC has been opposed ideologically to the Eurocommunist PCE line. Two main events have demonstrated this change in the majority: the approval by the PSUC, in opposition to the PCE, of a resolution supporting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (early 1980); and, at a January, 1981 congress, the dropping by the PSUC of all references to Eurocommunism from its program. The different groups within the PCE have their own publications and occasionally meet separately. From the preceding discussion, and contrary to what one would think from its adoption of the principle of democratic centralism, one concludes that the PCE is far from presenting a monolithic bloc. Two reasons are: (1) the existence of regional wings and (2) the fractional division of one of its main branches, i.e., the PSUC.

A strict application of democratic centralism would also have implied a party organization based on a working-site cell. Here again, reality does not conform with the principle. Not only are there no more working cells, but there are no cells at all in the

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<sup>164</sup> Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, p. 75.



present PCE. Indeed, the central committee decided in July, 1976 in Rome to suppress the cells and to replace them by a new basic structure – the 'agrupacion' – which, unlike the cell, holds public meetings and usually corresponds to an electoral ward. At that time, the Central Committee wanted to adapt the PCE organization to its new mass-based reality and to change the image of the party from one of a secret party to one of a fully democratic party in the liberal sense of the term.

To sum up this section concerned with the internal life of the PCE, one can say that the PCE organization presents several characteristics which make it very different from that which one would expect of a party claiming to adhere to the principle of democratic centralism. These characteristics are autonomous regional wings, the fractions within one of its wings, and the dropping of the cell structure.





#### D. The three parties in their political settings

Applying the Gramscian necessity for hegemony of the communist party over civil society prior to any revolution, the three communist parties adopt a similar tactic of political alliance with other political forces. They intend to build alliances of 'progressive forces' into a 'grand hegemonic coalition' which could replace the actual 'bourgeois hegemony' over their national civil society by a socialist hegemony. By doing so, they hope to reach a dominant political position as a result of successes in general elections.

But the question of hegemony is more a general aim than a pragmatic political stance. The three parties think of revolution and argue that it is not time for action because the situation is not ripe. They all agree that they should, by organizing their rank and file, reach a dominant position. But the political strategies of the three diverge because of the specific political strength of each party and its prospect of coming to power. The following section deals with the central political values put forward in the last ten years by the three parties in order to reach an hegemonic position over their national civil society.

#### The PCF

During the seventies, the polarization of French politics along right and left lines has been the dominant characteristic of the policies of alliances between the French political parties.<sup>165</sup>

On the left side of the political spectrum, Socialists (PS), Communists (PCF) and the Left Radicals (MRG) signed a common program in 1972 as an implementation of 'L'Union de la Gauche'. This 'Union de la Gauche' has known ups and downs along with the different elections in which the partners were unable to obtain the majority of the votes. The Socialists gave the responsibility for 'l'échec' to the Communists and vice-versa. The Left

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<sup>165</sup> Except for some centrist micro-parties, the two sides are clearly defined. No alliance between a party of one side with one of the other side is possible, not even conceivable.



finally obtained the majority in the 1981 presidential and following general elections.

What is interesting to note is the dynamics of the 'Union'. Concluded at a time when the Communists were electorally stronger than the Socialists, the common program was supposed to be, from the communist point of view, an instrument of hegemony over the Left. But since 1974, the PCF has been outnumbered by the PS in the legislative assembly, in terms of votes cast and seats held. The minorization of the PCF within the Left had important consequences for its political stance.

As a minority partner, the PCF had to comply rather than dictate in the 'Union de la Gauche' if it wanted to remain a member of the 'Union'.<sup>166</sup> In accordance with 'la logique de l'Union', the PCF must affirm its distinctive nature and discover 'son espace politique propre'. The PCF obsessively argues that (1) it is the only French revolutionary party, and (2) it is the only party of the working class. These two central elements in the dynamics of the PCF within the French Left will receive special attention.

In the beginning of the preamble of its statutes, the PCF emphasizes these two elements: "Parti de la classe ouvrière, parti révolutionnaire, le Parti Communiste Français."<sup>167</sup> The PCF constantly argues that it retains the monopoly of revolution. On one hand, it positively declares that it is "l'avant-garde" and "le seul qui oriente son action à l'aide d'une théorie scientifique vivante."<sup>168</sup> Paul Laurent, member of the Secretariat explains what is this revolutionary scientific theory:

Nous nous réclamons, c'est vrai, d'une théorie scientifique. Nous fondons notre action politique sur les lois de l'évolution sociale vue dans sa réalité profonde. Ce n'est pas une volonté idéale des communistes qui est à la base de leur action, c'est un regard scientifique, oui, sur la réalité économique, sociale, politique.<sup>169</sup>

On the other hand, the PCF negatively depicts the socialist party as reformist and opportunist: "ce parti attaché au réformisme...est par nature sensible à la pression de la bourgeoisie, il coopère avec des réactionnaires."<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Up to now, the PCF has opted to stick to its 'Union' stance. Viewing the actual philosophical grounds of the Western European communist parties and the PCF's lack of a new and proper model of communism, the refusal of the 'Union' by the PCF would be politically hazardous if not suicidal.

<sup>167</sup> Statuts du Parti Communiste Français, preamble.

<sup>168</sup> Etienne Fajon, L'Union est un combat (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1975), p.45.

<sup>169</sup> Paul Laurent, Le PCF comme il est, (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1978). See also: Georges Marchais, Le Défi Démocratique, pp.193-194.

<sup>170</sup> Ce que les Communistes veulent pour la France, document adopted by the XXII<sup>nd</sup> Congress, February, 1976. See also P. Burles, Histoire du réformisme en France, Paris, Editions sociales, 1976.





The working class has traditionally been considered by the PCF as its specific domain. The working class, according to the PCF, must be organized in a strong party. The PCF fulfills the role of organizing it. Moreover, according to itself, it is the only party which can improve the conditions of the workers. George Marchais argues: "La constitution d'une section socialiste dans une entreprise ne constitue pas un progrès pour le mouvement ouvrier. Quand dans une entreprise, il n'y a pas d'organisation du parti communiste, les travailleurs ne marchent que d'une jambe."<sup>171</sup> But if the working class needs the PCF, the party needs the working class as well because of the revolutionary character of the latter:

Chaque fois que se déroulent de grandes luttes sociales et politiques, les ouvriers y tiennent la place principale. Chaque fois que des batailles politiques sont sanctionnées par le suffrage universel, les aspects les plus avancés du mouvement social et du mouvement politique sont exprimés beaucoup plus massivement dans la classe ouvrière que dans les autres couches sociales. Il y a donc maintenant une réalité d'expérience qui vient confirmer ce rôle de la classe ouvrière: c'est la vie elle-même qui confirme la base fondamentale de constitution du Parti communiste... "parti de la classe ouvrière", cela veut dire, d'abord, parti qui a compris le rôle historique de la classe ouvrière, qui en tient pleinement compte dans sa politique et dans son effort d'organisation. C'est le parti qui donne à la classe ouvrière une priorité absolue tant dans sa politique que dans son organisation.<sup>172</sup>

In fact, the PCF is the party which has the greatest power of mobilization over the wage earners and workers through its work-place cells and through its control of the largest French trade-union federation, the Centrale Générale des Travailleurs (C.G.T.). By this power, the PCF enjoys a much greater role in France than what it would normally expect from its electoral strength.<sup>173</sup> The party still puts the primacy on the organization of work-place cells over local and rural cells.<sup>174</sup> The PCF's strong support for demagogical social claims and its equally strong refusal of any kind of austerity plans can be considered as a direct consequence of the party's special emphasis on work-place cells. In social and economic matters, the PCF develops a polarized view. Socialism is good, capitalism is wrong in essence. The PCF, therefore, refuses to manage 'the crisis of capitalism' as it calls the contemporaneous economic crisis. For the PCF, the capitalist system is the cause of the crisis. Even if accompanied by social compensations, no austerity plan can therefore be accepted a priori. But this is theoretical.

<sup>171</sup> L'Humanité, January 8, 1976.

<sup>172</sup> Paul Laurent, Le PCF comme il est, pp.28-29.

<sup>173</sup> George Lavau, "Les voies du PCF", Etudes, 1977, p.322.

<sup>174</sup> See art.18 and 19 of the party's statutes.





In fact, the party sometimes chose a compromise in order to maintain itself as a partner in the government. In the Mauroy government, the PCF is a very quiet partner for which governmental discipline is of primary importance. This governmental discipline prevails over some of the party's positions. For example, in January 1982, the then three communist ministers accepted the government opposition to the imposition of martial law in Poland contrary to the PCF's attitude of support. On the French political scene, the PCF follows the logic of "L'Union de la Gauche". Its minorization within the Left pushes it to define its "espace politique" based on its presence in the factories and with the claim that it pursues a scientific socialism.

## The PCI

Of the three parties, the PCI is the one which has most nearly put into practice Gramsci's principle of a necessary hegemony over civil society prior to any revolution. Its increase of popularity and votes made it an increasingly likely partner in any governmental coalition until 1978, when its electoral progression stopped.<sup>175</sup>

In the seventies, the PCI had put forward the 'compromesso storico' or historic compromise. The PCI proposed to the DC to form a governmental alliance which would have given Italy a strong and stable majority in Parliament. This proposal was linked to "an attempt to attract Catholics into a 'grand coalition', an hegemonic coalition which could [have] replaced the actual bourgeois hegemony over the Italian civil society by a socialist hegemony."<sup>176</sup>

The party worked hard to get itself accepted as a moderate partner in Italian political life. It ceased to be 'ouvriériste' and became 'interclassista'. The party became not only the party of the working class but also of the small bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia which is mainly communist now.<sup>177</sup> "Celui-ci estime désormais qu'il n'a pas a

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<sup>175</sup> In the 1976 elections, the PCI had a record of 34% of the votes. In the 1978 elections, it lost some four percent, and an additional one percent in 1983.

<sup>176</sup> Sidney Tarrow, "Italian Communism, the New and the Old", *Dissent* 24 (1), Winter 77, p.55.

<sup>177</sup> Hugues Portelli, "La longue marche du PCI", *Esprit*, November, 1976, p.559.



defendre les interets purement corporatifs de la classe ouvriere, mais ceux qui entrent dans le cadre de l'hegemonie de cette classe sur la societe."<sup>178</sup>

Correlatively, the party has argued that it was not the only representative party of the working class. Napolitano expressly said that "other parties such as the socialist and catholic parties, the trade unions, cooperatives and some other organizations also [play] a role in expressing legitimate needs of the working class."<sup>179</sup> The party has also declared that it was not the only revolutionary party and not even the vanguard party, it has nevertheless maintained that it has a specific role in the coming of the revolution because it is the only Italian party of 'scientific socialism'.<sup>180</sup> Contrary to the PCF's opposition between the working class and the other classes, the PCI has opposed the dichotomy of the productive and the parasitical classes, "adopting a dialogue with leaders of the enlightened Agnelli style of business which it contrasted with the parasitical rentier class."<sup>181</sup>

The party has also proven that it wanted to promote convergence among all the democratic and popular forces in its parliamentary work and for this reason could become a governmental partner.<sup>182</sup> In these times of economic crisis, it has accepted austerity plans.<sup>183</sup> But this acceptance was not wholeheartedly obtained in the party. The party was split in this regard between its will to turn itself into a party of "struggle and of government."<sup>184</sup> If there is an important link between the PCI and the largest Italian trade-union federation, the CGIL, the latter being communist inspired, there is no sign of dependence of the trade-union. In recent years, the PCI has not been able to dictate the policies of the union.<sup>185</sup> But this distance between the party and the communist trade union is an element permitting the interclassista character of the party, thus enabling it to adopt a more moderate less populist stance.

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<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Norman Kogan, "The Italian Communist Party: The Modern Prince at the Crossroads" in Eurocommunism and Detente, Norman Kogan, ed., pp. 121–122.

<sup>180</sup> Branko Pribicevic, "Eurocommunism and the New Party", in In search of Eurocommunism, Richard Kindersley ed., p. 170.

<sup>181</sup> Giovanni Russo, "The Italian Communist Party", in Eurocommunism, myth or reality, Paolo Filo della Torre and al; ed., p. 83.

<sup>182</sup> See Sergio Segre, "The Communist Question in Italy", Foreign Affairs, July, 1976, p. 692.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> See the discussion of this tension in Giovanni Russo, "The Italian Communist Party", p. 97.

<sup>185</sup> Norman Kogan, "The Modern Prince at the Crossroads", p. 101.





Since the party had shown, in the mid-seventies, its 'bona fides' vis-à-vis the Italian political system, it claimed that it could be accepted as partner in a governmental coalition. And there was a need for it at that time. As Sidney Tarrow, an American political scientist, puts it: "The DC [lacked] the political strength to carry out critical reforms without the direct cooperation of the opposition. It thus [faced] the paradox of needing communist collaboration to keep itself in power while the PCI [faced] the dilemma of having to cooperate with the government to be true to its image of national solidarity."<sup>186</sup> And the PCI moved along the way toward governmental coalition. First, in August, 1976, the Christian Democrats made an agreement with the Communists that the latter would abstain from voting in the Chamber of Deputies, thereby enabling the PCI to emerge for the first time not in opposition while the DC in turn was able to form a Government. Secondly, in July, 1977, the Andreotti Government was maintained in power by means of an agreement between the DC and the PCI on a joint program; this agreement gave the Communists a say in government policy. Thirdly, in March 1978, the Christian Democrats accepted the Communists as part of the parliamentary majority which supported Andreotti's new single-party cabinet. Pietro Ingrao became Speaker of the Chamber and the PCI obtained the chairmanship of several important parliamentary committees. The party's penetration was also emphasized by its entry into the state-controlled radio and television networks and its participation in the appointment to the boards of certain banks.

But the historic compromise was never fully put into practice. The PCI has never been a full member of the government; it has never held ministries. There were many reasons for this. First, the PCI has never been accepted by two very important determinants of Italian politics: the Catholic church and the United States. These two never endorsed the idea that it would be good for Italy to have the Communists in government. Moreover, within the DC and the PCI, there were strong wings opposing the historic compromise. The PCI could not definitely choose between revolution and governmental participation. It was confined to either supporting the government and raising the criticisms of its left wing or returning to the role of opposition and temporarily losing some key positions which could have enhanced its hegemony over civil society.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Sidney Tarrow, "The Italian Communism, the New and the Old", p.58.

<sup>187</sup> This crisis of identity was acknowledged by the party's press in such articles as "Il



In the 1978 elections, it lost grounds in terms of votes. It then gave up altogether the idea of "historic compromise" and indirect support of the DC. It turned to another alliance in order to reach the necessary hegemony over civil society. It was the beginning of "l'alternativa democratica".

"L'alternativa democratica", the democratic alternative, is the alliance of the Communists and the Socialists to reach power. The PCI strongly advocates such an alliance. They argue that they are ready to work with the Socialists on "a socialist reformism."<sup>188</sup> But the Socialists still prefer to share governmental responsibilities with the DC. One must note that the Socialists hold around 10% of the votes cast when the PCI holds 30% and that the Left is far from having a parliamentary majority in Italy.

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<sup>187</sup>(cont'd)partito oggi", Rinascita 35: 1 (January 6, 1978); "La salute del partito", Ibid., 34, September 1, 1978, p. 1.

<sup>188</sup> Berlinguer at the 1983 party's congress in Le Monde, March 8, 1983.





## The PCE

Since its legalization in 1977, the party's main emphases have been (1) the defense of liberal democracy, (2) the realization of an alliance of the Left, and (3) since its 1982 electoral 'debacle' and the victory of the PSOE in these elections, some criticisms of the socialist party.<sup>189</sup> In the last years of the Francoist regime, the party strongly stood for liberal democracy. The respect of the democratic constitution and the establishment of a democratic legal order was the foremost priority between the years 1977–1979. The PCE joined the other parties in their efforts to stabilize the new democracy. All the parties, except the extreme rightist Fuerza Nueva, were indeed conscious of the danger to democracy presented by terrorism and the economic crisis. A strong consensus on the idea that a military coup had to be avoided gathered the support of all. One major implementation of this consensus was the signing of the Moncloa Pact. This pact was essentially an austerity plan that offered social reforms and more parliamentary control over the economy in exchange for wage restraint. It was also a political agreement about legislative measures such as the reformation of the police, the control of television and the revision of the code of military justice.

In a speech before the Central Committee, Santiago Carrillo declared that such a signature by the PCE was "a demonstration of the party's will to constructively collaborate to the developments of the [Spanish] democratic process."<sup>190</sup> He added: "We were recognizing policies of cooperation of all the democratic forces, conscious of its necessity to guarantee the liberties which were so fragile at that time. We were insisting more than any other party on the popular mobilization to fight terrorism."<sup>191</sup>

Little by little, the national consensus vanished and social and economic concerns divided the Spanish political scene between right and left. In this debate, the PCE firmly stood for a broad consensus of the "forces of the Left", that is the PCE and the PSOE. Although the PCE has been electorally marginalized, it has never wanted to "play alone" and

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<sup>189</sup> This section has been elaborated on the basis of interviews with the Le Monde correspondent in Madrid, Thierry Maliniak, and with Andreu Claret, member of the PCE Secretariat, both in January 1983. Several PCE political pamphlets also were used.

<sup>190</sup> Mundo Obrero, February 10, 1981.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.



enjoy its marginalization for the sake of political purity, as the PCF did for so long before "l'Union de la Gauche".<sup>192</sup> Now that the PCE is completely marginalized in the Cortes vis-à-vis the PSOE<sup>193</sup>, the PCE has still decided firmly to support the PSOE government in "its will to change and progress in front of any attempt of the Right to block its activity in the Cortes and in the national life."<sup>194</sup> It also acknowledges that it is not the only party of the working class but puts the stress on its revolutionary character as opposed to the PSOE reformism. The PSOE is also criticized for ignoring the minor parties in Parliament. The PCE's criticism are directed to the PSOE's practice of consulting only the rightist Alianza Popular before the passing of major bills through the Cortes.<sup>195</sup> The PCE also views this practice of the PSOE as an attempt to 'tear apart the PCE'. The PCE warns that this practice could be a serious threat to the Spanish Left which could be weakened if its two major components, that is the PSOE as well as the PCE, did not collaborate.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> The PCE obtained 21, 23 and 4 seats in the 1977, 1979 and 1982 elections.

<sup>193</sup> Four PCE seats for 202 PSOE seats.

<sup>194</sup> Proyecto de Documento Politico, Central Committee, Nov.6, 1982, p.2.

<sup>195</sup> One of the major bill has been on the question of allowing therapeutical abortion. In the last general elections (October, 1982), 105 seats went to the Alianza Popular compared with 43 seats for the rest of the opposition forces.

<sup>196</sup> Proyecto de Documento Politico, Central Committee, Nov.6, 1982, p.14.





## E. Conclusion

The two core questions of this thesis in regard to the internal life of the parties and to their position in their political settings can now be answered: Is there room for a new kind of communism between the Russian socialism and social democracy? Is Eurocommunism a new kind of communism?

The PCI doctrine has been analyzed in chapter one in order to stress the long process of elaboration and maturation of a new kind of communism. It goes without saying that Gramsci and Togliatti brought something new to the communist debate. They laid the foundations of a new kind of socialist revolution in which the party needs to be hegemonic over civil society. They also "nationalized" communism. But, they did not fully endorse liberal democracy as a political aim, and the PCI is still Gramscian in essence and no doctrinal development has clarified Gramsci's and Togliatti's fuzziness vis-a-vis liberal democracy. Gramsci, Togliatti and the PCI cannot therefore be credited with developing a liberal democratic revolutionary communism as advocated in the PCI Eurocommunist stance. Doctrinally, Eurocommunism is not a (liberal) democratic path to socialism. At the time of revolution, the Eurocommunists will have to choose between respecting the liberal democratic institutions or destroying them and it is utopian to contend that, at a future stage, politics will vanish, making room for socialism.

The PCI internal life has changed over time: a real debate exists now within the rank and file and between the rank and file and the leadership. But the bolshevik structure still remains. Democratic centralism is strictly applied, and the top manoeuvres the base no matter what divergencies the latter may have with the former.

On the political scene, the PCI has prepared itself for being a responsible governmental partner. Its claim to come to power with the DC (Democrazia Christiana, Christian Democracy) was ruled out by the 1978 elections in which it lost ground. Since the late sixties, its behaviour has been determined by its size which makes it potentially a responsible party of government. At the same time, forces external to the Italian political scene and an anti-communist DC has prevented it to have access to power.



The PCE is the most adventurist party of the three. It has developed a very definite new doctrine in recent years. It is decisively advocating liberal democracy at the stage prior to revolution and strongly argues that it wants to reach an hegemonic position over civil society before this revolution. Like the PCI, however, the PCE is silent on this revolution. The writer must once more refute, in case of the PCE, the doctrinal possibility of Eurocommunism as a liberal democratic revolutionary communism.

Internally, the PCE is the most democratic of the three: its procedure of decision-making is less influenced by the top and more by the bottom. The application of democratic centralism permits some kind of organizational opposition within the party. The organization of the PCE does not differ much from a social democratic party.

On the political scene, the PCE tries to reach hegemony, whatever the odds of the elections and whatever its marginal position within the Spanish Left. One can see a strong conjunction between the PCE doctrine and its political activity.

From a doctrinal point of view, the PCF lacks a national philosopher on which the party could rely to establish eventual original developments of Marxism-Leninism. The party has always been led by non-intellectuals who preferred not to engage in theoretical adventure. In consequence, the party stance does not bear many signs of intellectual independence vis-à-vis Moscow.

The intellectuals within the PCF are marginalized out of the centers of decision. They also tend to be leaning toward a traditional Leninist interpretation of Marxism (Althusser, Molina, Vargas), when they do not specifically appraise the Russian model of socialism as, for example, the authors of L'URSS et nous do.

Internally, the party has changed very little from its bolshevik inception. The opposition within the party tends nevertheless to be more vocal. But the whole structure is moved from the top rather than from the bottom and the leadership takes many decisions which the base has never discussed and has to accept with no opposition, such as, for example, the abandoning of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

On the political scene, the PCF is marginalized within the Left. It does not really tend to be an hegemonic party as the PCI and the PCE. It is the party of the working class. While playing down many of its own claims under the socialist governmental umbrella, and presenting itself as a responsible partner, the PCF seems to wait for the downfall of the





PS before putting into practise its core political strategy.

In summary, the three parties have made some important transformations toward a full acceptance of liberal democracy. They have shown their goodwill to play the political game of the West. It appears that the parties will not be able to carry on their revolutionary principle in the near future; rather, they will go on respecting liberal democracy before achieving hegemony. Nevertheless, fundamental bolshevik dogmas have not been removed from the life of the parties, namely the necessity of a socialist revolution and democratic centralism. The bolshevik aim of making revolution and giving the power to a centrally organized party did not change. The parties, with perhaps the exception of the PCE, are strictly following democratic centralism. There is no official position that could jeopardize the existence and the application of this principle and put into question the nature of the vanguard of the party.

Methodologically, a more rigorous approach using hypothesis testing or theoretical models could have been used. For example, the democratization of the PCE could have been studied through hypothesis testing of elements of democratization. This approach would have given more depth to the analysis. But it was not required for the purpose of this study. Whatever can be shown and proven on the democratization and the liberalization of the parties, their liberalization and democratization mean very little if accompanied by elements of bolshevik doctrine and practice. The section on the internal life of the parties has shown that democratic centralism, for example, is an undiscussed bolshevik element of the doctrine of the three parties.





#### IV. The Eurocommunist Parties and the World

This fourth chapter is concerned with the foreign policy of the three parties. The study of foreign policy is of primary importance for the understanding of the subject because communism and consequently Eurocommunism traditionally have been based on a mutuality of interest transcending boundaries. The following analysis focuses on the relations of the parties with Russia and on their criticisms of the relations between the West and the Third World. The study of the link between the parties and Russia put the attempt of independent paths of the former from the latter to a test. The need for this analysis will be demonstrated in the ensuing paragraphs.

The communist parties have been created as sections of the Third Communist International. They were mere branches of an international network of revolutionary parties. Although they have developed national independent paths of communism, they still aim in common toward a communist revolution. In their criticisms of the relations between the West and the Third World, the communist parties are characterizing these relations as "imperialist". Their positions vis-à-vis the Third World nations indicate which side of the East-West confrontation they tend to favor.

By their electorate, the Communist parties of Western Europe are traditionally referred to as revolutionary parties aiming at the transformation of the capitalist society into a socialist society. In terms of foreign policy, the evil 'capitalism' means the imperialism of the mostly American 'forces du grand capital'. Imperialism is the way foreign capitalists act against the interest of the workers and more generally against the people. Revolutionary parties, such as the PCF, the PCE and the PCI, are therefore seen as parties which fundamentally struggle against imperialism. Section two of this chapter will develop this fundamental factor of the foreign policy of the three parties and present some of its correlative elements, for example the support for movements of national liberation or the support for pacifism.

It is recognized in this thesis that the Communist parties have moved from a total allegiance to Moscow and its Leninist model of Communism before looking at independent paths. If it has been modified with time, the link between the three parties and Moscow



has not disappeared. Mainly because of internal pressure to take a position vis-à-vis Moscow, both within the party and on the national political scene, the relations between Moscow and the three parties have been another important factor of their respective foreign policy. It will be analyzed in section one.

The two preceding issues and their correlative elements appear to influence overwhelmingly the foreign policy of the three parties. Other issues indeed count for very little compared to it. Two noticeable exceptions must however be mentioned: the PCF nationalism and the PCI pragmatic view of Italy as belonging to the West. These two considerations are of principal importance in the making of the foreign policy of the PCI and the PCF. They are, however, not contradicting the treatment of what the author has stated to be the key issues of the three parties. For example, the PCI has adopted a positive stance vis-à-vis NATO and the EEC on a pragmatic basis. But this pro-NATO stance does not prevent the party from basing its foreign policy on anti-imperialist, pacifist arguments. Equally, the PCF is passionately obsessed with the independence of France, and at the same time traditionally anti-imperialist and pacifist.

#### **A. Their Relations with the U.S.S.R**

Speaking either of autonomy or dependency of the three parties is giving a broad significance to their foreign policy. This foreign policy covers two topics : (1) The foreign relations between parties inside the international communist movement. Indeed, one may consider that there is, between the communist parties, a kind of foreign policy. (2) The foreign policy positions of each party vis-à-vis Moscow. In order to assess the reduced but still existent links between Moscow and the three parties under study, this section first will consider briefly the position of the three parties within the framework of the world communist movement. Second, the bilateral connections between Moscow and each of the parties will be described and analyzed. This will be done through a review of some





highlights concerning the relations between Moscow and each of the parties during the last five years. A choice of some highlights will have to be made among the multiple foreign policy interventions of the three parties. That choice will be made on the basis of the relative importance of events. On the one hand, events which appear to have originated many discussions inside each of the parties and on the national political scene of each party have been chosen for discussion. On the other hand, events which did not lead to many discussions have been rejected. But first, let us examine the foreign relations between parties inside the international communist movement.

In 1948, the Yugoslavian independent road to socialism shook the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). For the first time, a communist party opposed itself to the monolithic communist community and to its master, the Soviet Union. That event and some discussions of de-Stalinization led to the dissolution of the Cominform (April 1956). From that time onward, the world communist movement has not been represented as a whole, by any type of institution. Moreover, the 1956 Hungarian revolution represented an opportunity for many communist leaders, headed by Togliatti and his "concept of polycentrism" of the communist international movement, to create a political distance between themselves and Moscow.

In order to restore trends toward dependence and Moscow's role in the world communist movement, the Soviet leadership decided to convene world communist conferences. Despite many efforts to gather the various communist parties regularly, the Soviets only succeeded in organizing three such conferences from 1957 to the present. The last conference was held from June 5 to 17, 1969, in Moscow. In the seventies, no conference of that type could be convened. A European conference was nevertheless held during that decade.<sup>197</sup> It was the June–July 1976 East Berlin European Communist Parties Conference (ECPC). The ECPC has been considered as the most important recent event in the world communist movement with the exception of the Sino–Soviet summits.

In Berlin, there was a major split between what James P. McGregor, an American East European analyst, calls the parties loyal to Russia and the opposition parties among which are the three parties under study.

The loyalist parties were somewhat defensive in their statements about

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<sup>197</sup> The previous conference of the same kind was held in Karlovy Vary (Czechoslovakia) in April 1967.



inter-party relations. They denied the existence of or the desire to establish a formal or informal "centre" for the movement. They further claimed that conditions of equality and autonomy among parties already existed. The loyalists charged that the imperialists were attempting to undermine the unity of the communist movement and that only by fulfilling internationalist duties on the basis of proletarian internationalism could these attempts be resisted. Finally, the role of the CPSU was stressed in the loyalists' speeches to a degree that contrasted sharply with the main document.<sup>198</sup>

Among the oppositionists, Carrillo stated: "Moscow, where our dreams first began to come true, was for a long time a kind of Rome for us. We spoke of the Great October Socialist Revolution as if it were our Christmas. This was the period of our infancy. Today, we have grown up."<sup>199</sup> Also, Georges Marchais repeatedly stressed that the party's policies were made "in Paris, not in Moscow".<sup>200</sup> The General Secretary of the PCF denied any interest in such a conference. On the 2nd. of July, he wrote: "In our delegation's speech, we submitted the idea that future conferences like this will undoubtedly no longer meet the needs of the time."<sup>201</sup> Berlinguer strongly "emphasized the need of certain unnamed parties to abandon obsolete methods and noted that solidarity is based on autonomy and equality even though internationalism is an essential characteristic of inter-party relations."<sup>202</sup> The three parties decided to reject the Soviet concept of a monolithic international communist movement. The PCI, PCF and PCE did not participate in a united political force on the international scene, i.e. the world communist movement. Therefore, the core of that movement, the Soviet Union, had very little leverage through this movement to influence the various parties. The links, if there were any, between Moscow and the PCF, PCE and PCI must have another basis which could only be the bilateral relations between Moscow and each of those parties.

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<sup>198</sup> James P. McGregor, "The 1976 European Communist Parties Conference," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. 11, 1978, p. 345. The document in question –For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe– was published at the conclusion of the Berlin conference. "It was not signed, nor endorsed by votes, but merely issued without any characterization as a 'declaration' or 'communique' or even 'joint statement'." It, therefore does not reflect "the varying stances taken by the parties' spokesmen in their speeches to the conference." Milorad Popov, "Eurocommunism and the pan-European conference," World Today, vol. 32, 1976, p. 388.

<sup>199</sup> Milorad Popov, "Eurocommunism and the pan-European conference", p. 390.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., p. 390.

<sup>201</sup> L'Humanité, July 2, 1976.

<sup>202</sup> James P. McGregor, "The 1976 European Communist Parties Conference", p. 348.





## The PCF

The present analysis of the PCF relations vis-à-vis Moscow begins in 1972. During that year, the PCF in conjunction with the PS and the MRG signed the so-called "common program of government" which represented a radical turn in the political history of contemporary France. For the first time since the Popular Front, the bulk of the leftist political forces decided to unite their efforts in order to have access to power. For the PCF, that common program of government was a turning point in overcoming its political isolation. It was correlatively a step away from its traditional position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.<sup>203</sup> Indeed, the PCF needed "la logique de l'Union" to lessen its revolutionary dogmatism and to appear, in the eyes of the electorate, as fully devoted to the respect of Western liberal democracy. Therefore, a close link with the USSR represented an obstacle in that respect. The PCF had to create a distance between itself and Moscow.

The Soviet Union was therefore no longer praised in terms of "le pays du socialisme incarné" or "d'opposant pacifique et socialiste à l'imperialisme de Washington". The Soviet Union was viewed as a country like the others. Examples showing the political distance between the PCF and Moscow at that time are numerous. Marchais blamed the Soviet Union for the visit its ambassador extended to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing between the two ballots of the April 1974 presidential elections.<sup>204</sup> This same Marchais, contrary to his habit, did not spend his summer vacations in the Soviet Union for several years. In December 1975, the PCF posed some questions to the Soviets after the projection of a film by French television on a labour camp near Riga.<sup>205</sup> Marchais refused to see Brezhnev when the latter came to Paris in June 1977. Moreover, the PCF welcomed, to a certain degree, a few Russian dissidents. Pierre Jupin, member of the Politburo, shook hands with Leonid Pliouch during a meeting at "La Mutualité" (Nov., 1976).<sup>206</sup> In 1977, Jean Kanapa, the then head of the foreign policy commission, directly put into question the foreign policy of the Soviet Union toward the Eastern European countries. This had declared that

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<sup>203</sup> For the analysis of the pre-1972 years, see the chapters on history and on the party structure.

<sup>204</sup> Jean Elleinstein, *Ils vous trompent camarades*, Paris, Belfond, 1981, p.33.

<sup>205</sup> Neil McInnes, *Eurocommunism*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1976, p. 16.

<sup>206</sup> Jean Elleinstein, *Ils vous trompent camarades*, p. 37.





the interests of the Russian state have primacy over those of socialism in the relations between the USSR and the Eastern European countries.<sup>207</sup>

For five years, the trend of PCF–Soviet Union relations was toward criticisms and opposition. Looking back on that period, one may isolate some causes for that situation of unprecedented strained if not conflictual relations.

The insistence of the Socialists to give more credibility to the common program is certainly a major factor for the PCF's change of attitude vis-à-vis Moscow. Moreover, as has already been mentioned, this operation was motivated by electoral considerations. The Soviet Union possessed a negative image in French public opinion.

Another important factor determining the PCF's move toward more autonomy can certainly be found in the adoption of the then fashionable Eurocommunism. During the 1970–1978 period, the PCF enjoyed great electoral successes. During those successes, Gramsci's original way to socialism seemed to be the ideal solution to the crisis of Western European capitalism for the leaders of many European communist parties.

In 1978, everything began to change. Once more, the Soviet Union became the "untouchable homeland" of socialism for the PCF leadership.<sup>208</sup> Anyone who was in opposition to it was automatically labeled an anti-communist. Marchais went back to the Soviet Union on holidays. The PCF refused to participate in the December 1978 "Biennale des dissidents soviétiques".<sup>209</sup> On January 1980, Marchais broadcast his approval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The PCF was the only party of any strength in Western Europe to approve the invasion: the PCI and the PCE opposed it as did all the socialist parties. Through the publication of a book, L'URSS et nous, by five intellectual communists, the PCF had the opportunity to develop theoretically its concept of the Soviet Union.<sup>210</sup> The entire introduction of the book written by Francis Cohen was published in L'Humanité with a note of the Politbureau recommending its reading. The Soviet Union was presented in this introduction as the "natural" solution to the crisis of capitalism.

Le système encore dominant sur la planète, qu'on le baptise "occidental" ou qu'on l'appelle par son nom de capitalisme, ne parvient pas à sortir de la crise qui le mine à tous les niveaux. Une partie du monde a échappé à ce système

<sup>207</sup> Le Monde, November 12, 1982.

<sup>208</sup> The reasons of this move will be given in the course of the following discussions.

<sup>209</sup> Raymond Jean, La singularité d'être communiste, Paris, Seuil, 1979, p. 70.

<sup>210</sup> Francis Cohen, Alexandre Adler, Maurice Decailot, Claude Frioux et Leon Robel, L'URSS et nous Paris, Editions Sociales, 1978. The "Editions Sociales" is a PCF owned and run editing house.



pour former un système socialiste, tandis qu'une autre partie dite tierce, s'en affranchit dans un immense effort et regarde de plus en plus vers des solutions socialistes. C'est la première origine de la crise. La seconde est située dans les contradictions mêmes du système qui paraissent de plus en plus insolubles en dehors des transformations ouvrant elles aussi, la perspective socialiste.<sup>211</sup>

The author of this introduction and, through him, the PCF, reach, by means of this writing, a paroxysm in the presentation of a polarized world. The Soviet Union is the good, the unquestionable solution to suppress all the evils of capitalism. This solution still has some defects because errors have been made in the developing of the Soviet Union. The alleged reasons for these errors are however surprising, "La réalité est que la première tentative réussie de socialisme [that is the Soviet Union] a eu lieu dans une situation défavorable."<sup>212</sup> With this explanation, neither the model, the system, nor men like Stalin are considered to be the root of the errors. If things went somewhat wrong, it was for reasons of external environment!<sup>213</sup>

Two major events in the contemporary life of the PCF can be used as relevant for a deeper analysis of the new and actual position of the PCF vis-a-vis the Soviet Union: first, the Polish crisis and more particularly the December 1981 imposition of martial law; second, the 24th PCF Congress (February, 1982).

The Polish crisis has been the most recent event with regard to East-West relations which has caused a profound reaction from the PCF on the French political scene. The party's congress was a key event in the life of the PCF. It gave both to the leaders and to the rank and file the opportunity to set the party's positions on major questions.

The PCF did not hesitate in its reactions to the December, 1981 military takeover in Poland. By it, General Jaruzelski imposed martial law because Poland "was under an imminent and mortal danger."<sup>214</sup> Solidarity had gone "too far"; that is beyond its vocation of a union. It had become "political".<sup>215</sup> It was therefore responsible for the calamities. The PCF intended "s'abstenir de toute initiative qui pourrait gêner la recherche nécessaire d'une issue pacifique à la crise".<sup>216</sup> Very early, L'Humanité argued that in this affair, there was a great deal of criticism while nothing was said about Zimbabwe, Guatemala or El Salvador,

<sup>211</sup> L'Humanité, March 3, 1978.

<sup>212</sup> L'Humanité, September 4, 1982.

<sup>213</sup> Although highly praised, the Russian model of socialism is nevertheless rejected for France. The PCF has indeed developed "la voie française au socialisme."

<sup>214</sup> L'Humanité, Dec. 14, 1981.

<sup>215</sup> L'Humanité, Dec. 18, 1981.

<sup>216</sup> L'Humanité, Dec. 14, 1981; see also the Dec. 17 Marchais declaration in L'Humanité, Dec. 18, 1981.







where many reasons for criticism existed. The communist newspaper accused the Right and the Socialists of "anti-socialism" and "anti-communism".<sup>217</sup>

As it had been on the Afghanistan question, the PCF was isolated on the French political scene with respect to Poland. Every party except the PCF condemned the imposition of martial law. The PCF was also shaken internally; the four communist ministers approved the position of the French national government which directly opposed martial law. Radical opposition also was expressed by thousands of signatures of militants who in a severe diatribe were condemning the action of the Polish military.

In his introductory speech to his party's XXIVth Congress, Marchais took the opportunity to recall the party's position on the Soviet Union and in general, on the "socialist countries". He referred to the famous PCF formula, "du bilan globalement positif des pays socialistes." Later, he had the opportunity to express what the PCF meant by that expression:

A travers toute une gamme de moyens à la mesure de leur diversité croissante, les pays socialistes témoignent d'une réelle capacité à faire face aux contraintes extérieures. Leur croissance en est certes ralentie, mais elle reste en règle générale supérieure à celle des pays capitalistes... Dans l'ensemble, ils s'attaquent aux problèmes qu'ils connaissent sans mettre en cause les droits acquis, sans renoncer à la sécurité de l'emploi, sans imposer une politique d'austerité.<sup>218</sup>

Marchais made in his speech to the 24th Congress a more theoretical, political argument in favour of the nature of the socialist countries. Naturally, it was in direct opposition to the capitalist countries because of the polarized view of the world of the PCF.

Nous pensons que les pays socialistes recèlent... des acquis et des possibilités qui leur permettent de développer l'ensemble des libertés individuelles et collectives, des droits économiques et sociaux, des droits à la culture et à l'éducation des divers aspects de la souveraineté populaire et de la participation.<sup>219</sup>

Those "possibilities" have nothing to do with "all the cynicisms of imperialism (i.e.: Reagan, Apocalypse Now, Vietnam, Thatcher and Bobby Sands, the Turkish "fascist" general Evren, etc.)."<sup>220</sup> After a presentation of such monstrosities, it is natural for Marchais to conclude emphatically: "Devant tant de cynisme d'impudence, d'hypocrisie, je dis à ces fleurons du capitalisme: 'Non, décidément, messieurs, madame, quand il s'agit de parler de liberté: pas

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<sup>217</sup> L'Humanité, Dec. 15, 1981.

<sup>218</sup> Georges Marchais, *Le défi français contre la crise*, unpublished manuscript of a conference given at the Central School of the Party, Nov. 26, 1982.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p.61.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., p.95.



vous!"<sup>221</sup>

How is one to explain such a praise of the Soviet Union ? Although unique among the "major" political forces of Western Europe, such praise used to be the rule for all Western European communist parties for more than a generation. Autonomy, not dependence on Moscow, is deviating from the norm. The sudden return to the normal alignment is nevertheless surprising and deserves explanation. The change of the political line can be understood on the basis of three major and intertwined reasons. First, there was the political failure of the partners of "L'Union de la Gauche" to trust each other in order to actualize the common program of government in 1977. Second, the Left was defeated in the 1978 national election. Third, the election resulted in the marginalization of the PCF within the Left in terms of seats held in the National Assembly and the Senate. Patrick Jarreau, Le Monde specialist of the PCF, had a brilliant reflection on this topic. He wrote: "La rupture de l'Union de la Gauche [in addition to its electoral consequences] entraine un revirement progressif, puis brutal, des communistes francais, qui ne peuvent s'isoler à la fois sur le plan intérieur et sur le plan extérieur."<sup>222</sup> The internal political game marginalized the Communists on the Left vis-à-vis the Socialists. The PCF had to find a political space and an unshared practical ideological commitment in the French political scene.<sup>223</sup> These elements however do not explain by themselves the total appraisal of the Soviet Union made since 1978 by the PCF, but they can explain its shift. Other elements should be stated in an effort to understand why the alignment of the PCF with Moscow, which was strategically required, could be sustained by the party. Those elements will be stated at the end of this chapter since they are common elements to all three parties.

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<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

<sup>222</sup> Le Monde, Nov. 12, 1982.

<sup>223</sup> The PCF's government participation of 1981 did nothing to increase its strength in comparison to the PS.





## The PCI

As was shown in the historical chapter, the Italian PCI has been politically distant from Moscow for three decades. In fact, stability is a major characteristic of the PCI-Soviet relations. Electoral successes or defeats as well as changes in the domestic strategy did not have a significant effect on those relations. For example, the 1978 electoral defeat led the PCI to forget the "compromisso storico" in favour of "l'alternativa" with the PSI, but this had no effect on PCI-Soviet relations. Another main characteristic of those relations is the importance placed on nuances by the PCI in its dealings with the Soviets and the other socialist countries. Its criticisms are sometimes very direct and violent but the PCI takes much care to keep the link intact, never trying to break it. In addition, the PCI would never put into question the socialist character of the Soviet Union.

Since Togliatti's speech on "polycentrism", many declarations have confirmed that the PCI wishes to maintain its relations with Moscow. Among events of the last decade, one may quote the leading role the PCI played in the organization of Eurocommunist meetings dating from 1975-1977, its reaction to the publication of Santiago Carrillo's book, Eurocommunism and the State<sup>224</sup> and the PCI answer to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and to the imposition of martial law in Poland.<sup>225</sup> The lack of criticism of the state of liberties in the Soviet Union and the foreign policy of the USSR are summarized in the following excerpts of Berlinguer's speech:

Oui, j'ai souvent dit que dans le système soviétique, on ne nous laisserait pas construire le socialisme que nous voudrions. Bien sûr, personne ne peut nier que les Soviétiques se comportent comme une grande puissance qui ambitionne d'influencer la réalité mondiale, cela ne fait aucun doute.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Unita, September 11, 1979.

<sup>225</sup> On Poland, the PCI made a common declaration with the PCE. The reader is referred to the discussion of the PCE position with regard to the first point of discussion: "non-respect of liberties." In this instance, the Soviets directly attacked the PCI for its alleged anti-sovietism. (Tass 31/12/81 in World Affairs Report, No. 2, 1982, p. 224); Pravda (25/1/82, 14/2/82) accused the PCI to be against the interests of peace and of socialism. Novoie Vremia (18/2), see also the Hungarian "Nepzudasag" reaction in (Unita 29/1/82.) Berlinguer strongly reacted Pravda's condemnation saying: "The PCI would not accept any anathema from Moscow." (Unita 1/2/82).

<sup>226</sup> Jean Elleinstein, Ils vous trompent, camarades, p. 59.



But these criticisms have limits and should be understood with all their nuances. On liberty, the PCI's criticisms tend to be "abstract" rather than polemical, unlike those of the PCE. The PCI refuses to accept the Soviet model but does not put into question the socialist character of the Soviet Union. On foreign policy, the PCI has a middle of the road position. It theoretically criticizes the politics of the blocs and the Soviet participation in it, but it never qualifies the Soviet Union as an "imperialist power".

Even though the relationship between the PCI and the Soviets was strained, it never broke. It was not even put into question at a fundamental level. The PCI wanted to keep the lines of communications open. For example, Berlinguer, contrary to Marchais, never refused Soviet invitations and the Soviets never prevented him from speaking, contrary to what they did to Carrillo. The PCI, contrary to the PCF, was present at the 25th CPSU Congress (1976) and Berlinguer delivered a speech in Moscow during the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution.<sup>227</sup> As J. W. Friend, an American political scientist writing in Problems of Communism, puts it, the PCI insists that its policy toward the USSR "is directed neither to a break nor toward changes of hypothetical camps, but toward dialogue (confronto) and understanding, with all the revolutionary and democratic forces of Europe and the world."<sup>228</sup> The party also openly declared: "We want to extend and not to reduce our relations in all directions."<sup>229</sup>

There are reasons for such an attitude. On one hand, the criticisms are the practical outcome of an internal critical debate on Soviet Bolshevism, Stalinism and "existing socialism". The PCI's literature in that respect is very abundant. Politically, the PCI wants to receive the support of a very large spectrum of the electorate in order to win over Gramsci's hegemony in Italy. It must, therefore, secure those who are not yet part of the Marxist-Leninist tradition and categorically refuse any restriction on pluralism and liberal democracy. On the other hand, the link with the Soviet Union is kept for many reasons. As a member of the Third International, the PCI has developed special links of friendship and trade with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. Those links

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<sup>227</sup> During those celebrations, Carrillo was refused the right to speak and Marchais was absent.

<sup>228</sup> J.W.Friend, "The Root of Autonomy in Western European Communism", Problems of Communism, Sept-Oct. 1980, pp. 42-43.

<sup>229</sup> Antonio Rubbi, PCI head for foreign affairs, "L'iniziativa internazionale del PCI", in Rinascita (Rome, April 1980, No. 11, p.3).





would be very costly to lose.<sup>230</sup> Moreover, the internal political and philosophical debate on Marxism has originated the idea among the PCI leadership that the continuing link with the Soviet Union could help the Eastern Bloc to become more democratic. The PCI stresses the universal relevance of democratic values. Their democratic and pluralist form of socialism could have a contagious impact on the Soviet Bloc.

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<sup>230</sup> Being common to the three communist parties, those links will be discussed at the end of this chapter.



## The PCE

The most appropriate moment to begin a review of the contemporaneous relations between the PCE and the Soviet Union appears to be Franco's death, which meant the possibility for Spain to transform Francoism into democracy. For the PCE, it meant the possibility to act openly after legal recognition. From that moment, many events have paced the PCE relations with Moscow. Among them, the publication of Carrillo's book Eurocommunism and the State and the Polish question will receive our particular attention because these events have served as centres of polarization for the Soviet-PCE relations.

In his book, Santiago Carrillo bluntly criticizes the monstrous aberrations of Stalinism and attacks, without naming anyone, Stalin's heirs. He accuses them not for having disassembled the Stalinist system of government, but for their non-respect of human rights and for the economic backwardness of the Soviet model.<sup>231</sup> The Russian reaction to this book was specially strong. The Russians responded to Carrillo's book in Novoi Vremia (Modern Times). They mainly argued that the purpose of the PCE General Secretary was: (1) to create some kind of opposition between the communist parties of Western and Eastern Europe and; (2) to run down the "real socialism" – the Russian – because communism is the one and only socialism and arguing to the contrary is showing "opportunism" and vulgar anti-Sovietism.

On the Polish question, the PCE was strongly mobilized. During the months following the imposition of marshall law, the secretariat, the executive committee and the central committee expressed violent criticisms. The major points discussed by the party were: (1) the non-respect of individual, social and national liberties in Poland and; (2) the criticisms of the Soviet model. These points appeared in a resolution delivered by the central committee in January, 1982.

On the first point, the PCE Central Committee recalls some antecedents, the 1956 national uprising and the 1970 Gdansk events. It then positively judges the influence of the church in the 1980–1981 movement of renovation. Although it acknowledges that counterrevolutionary elements infiltrated Solidarity, it argues:

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<sup>231</sup> Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, (Westport, Lawrence Hill, 1978), pp. 159–168.





penser que l'action d'éléments contrerévolutionnaires et d'agents imperialistes tirent profit de quelque erreur ponctuelle du Parti, pourrait mener la classe ouvrière à se soulever, ainsi que tout le peuple, contre un régime socialiste, lors d'une crise si profonde du capitalisme comme celle de l'époque actuelle, penser cela, donc mène à une observation que nous n'acceptons pas et qui, en fait, coïncide avec les conclusions bourgeoises, c'est à dire, considérer le socialisme comme un régime social qui a échoué.<sup>232</sup>

For the PCE Central Committee, the imposition of martial law also represents a counter-revolution for Poland because:

un régime militaire ou une dictature de l'armée est une formule de gouvernement tout à fait étrangère au marxisme et au leninisme. Dire que l'armée maintient par la force le pouvoir des ouvriers et des paysans, justement contre les ouvriers et les paysans polonais, est un contresens que personne ne peut soutenir rationnellement.<sup>233</sup>

The link with the second point, the criticism of the Soviet model, is made through the argument that the Polish "failure" is not "l'idée du socialisme et du communisme, mais plutôt l'expectation d'un modèle opposé, d'un système politique et économique que contredisait la réalité polonaise."<sup>234</sup>

That model is condemned because the Great October Revolution, considered by the PCE as "l'évènement le plus décisif de l'histoire de l'homme,"<sup>235</sup> degenerated into "un montage bureaucratique ou l'avant-garde tend à disparaître au profit de l'instrument du pouvoir."<sup>236</sup> Marxism was transformed into ideology (in the negative Marxist sense of the word) under Stalin by the Russian affirmation that the result of the revolution was "le socialisme complet".<sup>237</sup>

From what has been said so far, among the three parties studied, the PCE appears, on all accounts, foremost in its criticisms of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union realized this and consequently subjected the PCE to the most violent attacks. The Soviet-PCE relations are so bad that the Russians are currently trying to develop internal opposition within the PCE after the failure of some pro-Soviet elements around Enrique Lister to form a new communist party in the seventies.<sup>238</sup> Unlike the PCI, the PCE has been equally against the two superpowers at least in its public image.

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<sup>232</sup> Resolution du Comité Central du PCE sur la situation en Pologne, Madrid, 9-10/1/1982, p. 6.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>238</sup> Interview with Andreu Claret, member of the PCI Secretariat, Jan. 1983.



## Common features

Because of their common membership in the Third International, the three parties have developed common characteristics which link them to the core of the Third International, Moscow. Those features are essentially financial or business matters and pro-Soviet rank and file.

It has been alleged that the Italian and French communist parties received cash from the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.<sup>239</sup> Moreover, both parties do receive funding from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by means of preferred trade agreements with communist party run firms such as the Russian based and PCI owned Restital. The business parameter has certainly played a role in the maintenance of a link between the PCF, the PCI and the Eastern Bloc. It is difficult, however, to measure its strength.

The three parties have pro-Soviet elements. Those elements are mainly constituted by old generation members who have never been de-Stalinized". In Italy, there is also a strong PCI "new left", the views of which do not necessarily coincide with those of the Soviet Union but the Marxism of which is very close to the bolshevik model. This "new left" is qualified as pro-Soviet. It is grouped around Pietro Ingrao and Armando Cossutta. In Spain, there is a strong pro-Soviet minority within the PSUC. This has, however, no direct impact on the PCE political line. In France, Jeannette Vermeersch-Thorez, the widow of the former General Secretary Maurice Thorez, is the most prominent advocate of the Soviets.

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<sup>239</sup> Jean Montaldo, Les finances du PCF (Paris, Albin Michel, 1977); Michael Ledeen and Claire Sterling, "Italy's Sugar Daddies", The New Republic, April 3, 1976. No data or discussion on the PCE - Soviet monetary link could be found.





## B. The Communist Parties and the World

This section will deal first with the condemnation of imperialism by the PCF, PCE and PCI and the consequences of this condemnation both for the pacifist movement and for the support of national liberation movements. Second, it will present the position of each party in the East–West confrontation. Third, the stance of each party vis-à-vis the European community will be analyzed.

### The communist parties and imperialism

The struggle against imperialism is a core issue because it is an easy expression of revolutionary stances for the Communist parties of Western Europe which endure difficulties in staying 'revolutionary', as they pretend to be. In the struggle against imperialism, the Communist parties find an opponent which they depict in such a terrible way that they can sustain 'revolutionary stances' against it. The word 'imperialism' carries, indeed, a powerful content for the members of the three parties. It has been defined by the Xth Congress of the PCE as:

the will to dominate and to exploit, for its own benefit, foreign people and the will to realize a policy of threat and pressure through military, economical and political means. It is also intended to develop a whole series of conspirations and manoeuvres to put into power weak and friendly governments. It is the biggest danger for peace and the democratic process of the people.<sup>240</sup>

The three parties derive similar political consequences from their anti-imperialist stances. They support pacifism in Western Europe and in the East–West confrontation while they strongly support leftist national liberation movements in the Third World.

Their support for national liberation movements is almost indiscriminate and unconditional. Nicaragua, Cuba, the leftist national liberation movements in El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, Bolivia, Puerto Rico, South Africa and Timor are all supported in their stances for liberation. These stances are seen by the Communist parties as the struggle of "mouvements révolutionnaires et progressistes qui se battent pour l'émancipation

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<sup>240</sup> Tesis aprobadas en el X Congreso del PCE, unpublished manuscript, p.5. Translated by the writer.



économique et sociale de leur pays contre une forme ou une autre d'impérialisme."<sup>241</sup>

It is interesting, however, to note the absence of condemnation by the PCI and the PCF of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan or the Vietnamese pro-Russian invasion of Cambodia. The Third World countries would therefore only struggle against one kind of imperialism, that is a Western type of imperialism.<sup>242</sup> In order to show the difference between Russian actions and American imperialism, a prominent French Communist claims that "the Russians help revolutionaries the world over, with no thought of financial gain--witness their generosity to Cuba and Vietnam."<sup>243</sup> But unlike the PCI and the PCF, the PCE equally condemns both Russian and American imperialism in the Third World: "The objective reality forces us to recognize that there are negative aspects of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in its manifestations of a superpower, for example in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan in the internal affairs of other countries."<sup>244</sup>

The struggle against imperialism has a positive correlative element, the struggle for peace and disarmament. The three parties view the arms race as an imperialist act. Through the arms race, the imperialists impose their will on the people. Contrary to the imperialists, according to the communist parties, the people are fundamentally in desire of peace. Therefore, the struggle for peace and disarmament directly opposes the imperialist views, as declared by Marchais in his report to the XXIVth Congress:

Nous voulons un monde de paix. Il est indispensable [pour ce faire] que se renforce, notamment en France et en Europe, ce mouvement populaire et humaniste, déjà d'une rare ampleur, qui se développe sous des formes multiples pour imposer l'arrêt de la course aux armements et la recherche d'une solution politique négociée de tous les conflits. <sup>245</sup>

<sup>241</sup> G. Marchais' Report to the XXIVth PCF Congress, 1982, p.66, unpublished manuscript. For the PCF, see also L'Humanité, 7 octobre 1982. For the PCE, see the above mentioned thesis of the Xth Congress. For the PCI, the writer has compiled the following headlines of L'Unità for the period Jan.-July 1982 : 7.2 message of the PCI central committee to the Sandinist Front in Nicaragua; 10.3 meeting PCI-the Algerian FLN; 11.3 message of the PCI to the Communist party of Mexico; 24.4 meeting PCI-PC of Guatemala; 14.5 visit of a Nicaraguan minister to Rome; 8.6 meeting PCI-PC of Uruguay; 10.6 meeting PCI-PC of Venezuela; 15.6 meeting PCI-PC of Argentina; 6.7 meeting PCI-MAPUOC of Chile; 7.8 Chiaromonte, member of the PCI direction and secretariat, visit Cuba and Nicaragua; 18.7 message of the PCI to the Sandinist Front of Nicaragua. A similar compilation could have been done in Mundo Obrero(PCE) and L'Humanité(PCF).

<sup>242</sup> This is equally the view of Roy Godson, Eurocommunism (London, Macmillan, 1978), p.111.

<sup>243</sup> The Economist, Nov.5, 1977, p.64.

<sup>244</sup> Tesis aprobadas en el X Congreso del PCE, p.2.

<sup>245</sup> G. Marchais' report to the XXIVth PCF Congress, p.45. The literature of the three parties this subject is expansive. In Nov.1981, every issue of L'Humanité covered a subject related to world peace and disarmament. See also L'Humanité, Oct.6, 1982 (Report of Maxime Grimet to the PCF central committee : Plus que jamais lutter pour la





But who are the imperialist powers? To this question the answer differs from one party to the other. While all parties have a rather bad opinion of the USA and characterize it as an imperialist power, the PCF's view of the two superpowers simply translates into a fight between the good and the bad. The PCI's view is more nuanced, and the PCE's view is that both Russia and the USA are basically imperialist in their dealings with Europe. It should also be noted that the PCF's criticism of imperialists extends to the West Germans.<sup>246</sup>

### The East-West confrontation

Not surprisingly, the PCF is 'anti-Atlantist' as well as nationalist in defense matters. While the PCF accepts the position of France in the western camp and its consequences with regard to defence, it virtually opposes any political link with the NATO members or any other country:

Membre de l'alliance atlantique --qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec l'organisation militaire intégrée de l'OTAN dans laquelle nous ne sommes pas et dans laquelle il est exclu que nous retournions, sous une forme ou une autre--, la France doit assumer les engagements que cette appartenance comporte... [Mais] en tout état de cause, nous défendons et nous défendrons de manière intransigeante l'indépendance et la souveraineté de la France. La France peut préserver, en toutes circonstances, son entière capacité d'action. Elle peut refuser tout alignement. Elle peut faire entendre sa propre voix et prendre toutes les initiatives positives qui dépendent d'elle. [Car] grâce à ce qu'elle représente dans l'histoire de l'humanité, grâce à ses atouts non seulement matériels, mais scientifiques, techniques et culturels, grâce aux capacités et à la combativité démontrées au long des siècles par son peuple, la France peut jouer un rôle international bien supérieur à sa superficie, à sa population, à sa puissance économique et militaire. À condition qu'elle mène une politique fondée sur la paix, l'indépendance, la sécurité, la démocratie et la justice pour toutes les nations.<sup>247</sup>

In 1976, the PCF adopted the principle of the national nuclear "force de frappe" as a component of what Neil MacInnes calls 'the party's superbly patriotic line'.<sup>248</sup>

In 1972, the PCI ceased to criticize NATO and since 1975 has approved the Italian participation in it. This approval was mainly justified for the following reasons. First, the

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<sup>245</sup>(cont'd) paix. Also in 1982, the PCF made a special address on this theme in the UN (L'Humanité, 12 mai 1982.) For the PCE, see Tesis aprobadas en el X Congreso del PCE, p. 1.

<sup>246</sup> See, for example, the report of Vaillant-Couturier to the XXIIth Congress, Le Monde, Feb. 7, 1976.

<sup>247</sup> G. Marchais' Report to the XXIV PCF Congress, p.46-47.

<sup>248</sup> Neil MacInnes, Eurocommunism, p.23. On the 'force de frappe', see Marc Riglet, "La politique étrangère du PCF", in Projet, no. 150, 1978, p.850.



PCI argued that an opposition to NATO

would not be in line with the interests and deepest aspirations of the working masses and the entire nation. This is one of the reasons why it has said that it does not raise the question of Italy's withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance, since such a move, just as any other unilateral withdrawal from one or the other bloc, ...would not only be unrealistic, but would in the end have the effect of hindering or even reversing the process of international detente, which is in the interests of all the people and concretely stands as the only way to arrive at a gradual overcoming of the blocs themselves.<sup>249</sup>

Second, NATO is positively viewed by the PCI because, contrary to the Warsaw Pact for the countries of Eastern Europe, NATO "proceeds along the Italian road to socialism without constraints."<sup>250</sup> Moreover, according to Berlinguer, NATO could also serve as a shield for the construction of socialism with liberty: "I want Italy to remain in NATO 'also' for this reason and not only because our exit would upset the international balance. I feel I am safer on this side."<sup>251</sup> The expression of such a position by the Secretary of a Communist party has interested many scholars. An American specialist on Italian politics, Robert Putnam, provides some important reasons for such support of NATO, namely, "the changes in the Italian public opinion that made opposition to Italy's Western alignment extremely costly for the PCI and the constraints imposed by the PCI's need to seek alliances with non-communists."<sup>252</sup> Some scholars have raised the question as to the limiting terms or conditions of the commitment.<sup>253</sup> Norman Kogan, an American political scientist, emphasizes the geographical limitations of the PCI commitment to NATO. He says that this commitment does not apply to the United States policies in the Third World.<sup>254</sup> It has been seen indeed that the PCI's outlook on most Third World issues parallels the Russian viewpoint. Accepting NATO in Europe and embracing Russian foreign policy is a rather ambiguous policy to say the least. On the particular question of a double allegiance to Russia and NATO, several journalists have posed the following type of question to the PCI leaders. Suppose that Italy was the subject of an attack by the Warsaw Pact? Their answers have never been clear cut. The PCI leaders have argued that

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<sup>249</sup> Interview of Berlinguer in Corriere della Sera, June 15, 1976.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> Robert Putnam, "Interdependence and the Italian Communist Party", in International Organization, 1978, p.301.

<sup>253</sup> See for example, Kevin Devlin, "Eurocommunism between East and West", in International Security, vol.3, 1979, p.100 and Norman Kogan, "The Italian Communist party : the Modern Prince at the Crossroads", in Eurocommunism and Detente, R. Tokes, ed., p.114.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid., p.114.





the Warsaw Pact is a defensive alliance and therefore will not attack.<sup>255</sup> They have also maintained that, "in the unlikely event of a showdown, [they] as a party could not be expected to work against the general interests of the Soviet Union."<sup>256</sup>

Regarding the world balance of power, the PCE is the most neutral of the three parties. At the time of the negotiations between Spain and NATO for the eventual entry of the former into the latter, the PCE resolutely stood against such entry. Andreu Claret, a member of the Party Secretariat, has stated that the PCE was advocating a status of non-alignment for Spain based on the Austrian or Yugoslavian model. In the same way, a thesis adopted by the Xth Congress proclaims that "the party favours politics of non-alignment with the military blocs, Spain is participating as an observer to the conference of the movement of the non-aligned countries and [that] it should progress in this way."<sup>257</sup> NATO is rejected for two reasons: the absence of any military interest for the defense of Western Europe and the negative American impact on Western Europe deriving from the leadership of the USA in NATO. Carrillo has suggested that:

NATO justifies its existence on the grounds of a possible Soviet attack.... But since for more than twenty years no Soviet aggression has taken place and the fundamentally defensive nature of the Warsaw Pact has been confirmed, NATO is becoming a bureaucratic superstructure in search of a goal with which to justify itself. In the last resort it remains above all an instrument of American political, economic and military control over Europe.<sup>258</sup>

In the Spanish political game of today the NATO question is one of the main issues carried by the PCE. The PCE opposition to NATO is, by tradition, related to the party struggle against 'imperialism'. Fighting against the entry of Spain into NATO brings to mind, for the party members, the revolutionary character of the PCE. As Carrillo said, "We do not believe that the entry of Spain into NATO will help the defense of our country ....It will 'pulverize' Spain and we are not looking to be 'pulverized' for the best benefit of the multinationals and the North American imperialism ...[which] we consider as the principal enemy of our country, as its opponent."<sup>259</sup> But unlike the PCF and to a lesser extent the PCI, the PCE is not one-sided in the East-West debate. It also recognizes the imperialist character of the Warsaw pact vis-a-vis peace and the independence of the people of

<sup>255</sup> Giancarlo Pajetta, the then head of the PCI office of International Relations, Corriere della Sera, May 30, 1976.

<sup>256</sup> Luciano Lombardo Radice, Encounter, May 1977, p.13.

<sup>257</sup> Tesis aprobadas en el X Congreso del PCE, p.6.

<sup>258</sup> Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, p.60.

<sup>259</sup> Santiago Carrillo, speech given in Madrid in March 1982 which appeared in a PCE unpublished manuscript translated by the writer.



Europe. It pronounced itself for the "simultaneous dismantlement of the military blocs as much in the East as in the West."<sup>260</sup>

### The Eurocommunist parties and Europe

The following paragraphs will analyze the positions of the parties on Europe.<sup>261</sup> They deal with the question of the supranational character of Europe and with the positions of each of the three parties with regard to the extension of the European Community to Spain, Portugal and Greece.

France and Italy are founding members of the European Community (1958). Spain is not a member yet, but it has requested to be admitted. The political stakes of the Community lie in the acceptance or the refusal, by parties of member-states, of its supranational character. The PCF has strong nationalist feelings; it is therefore opposed to any devolution of powers from the member-states to the European institutions, because nationalist feelings are contradictory to the development of a supranational Europe. On the contrary, the PCI and the PCE believe that a stronger Europe would be more beneficial. The stances of the latter for revolution are essentially transnational while the PCF's ideas are strictly developed in the French national context. Correlatively, the three parties have similar diverging views on the admission of Spain and Portugal to the Communities. Of course, the pro-European PCE is favorable to such an extension as is the PCI. Not surprisingly, the PCF is opposed to it.

The completely positive position of the PCI-PCE for a supranational Europe is based on several reasons, most of which constitute reasons of opposition for the PCF. The favorable PCI-PCE position is first based on their refusal of a bipolar world shaken by the threats of a Russian-American conflict. A more politically united Europe would be a factor of stability and peace for the whole world. As Ramon Tamames, a member of the PCE's Executive Committee, puts it, "Western Europe is the only region of some

<sup>260</sup> Tesis aprobadas en el X Congreso del PCE, p.5.

<sup>261</sup> Europe refers here to the European Community and its institutions. The European Community, officially known as the European Communities, is the collective designation of the ten state European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Its common institutions are the Council of Ministers and the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. The member-states of the community as of April 1, 1983, are Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.





importance where a new political and economical unit can be established which by its dimensions could compare with the Soviet Union and the United States."<sup>262</sup> Manuel Azcarate develops the same idea when he states that the unification of Europe "can be an independent factor of world politics and therefore can help to overcome the present bipolar situation in which two superpowers decide on many matters and can create very dangerous situations of conflict."<sup>263</sup>

Opposite to the PCE-PCI disdain of the bipolar world, the PCF sees the world as bipolarized and accepts this polarization. As mentioned earlier, the French Communists analyzed the international situation through the idea that, in the last resort, world policy is shaped by the irreconcilable conflict of two camps: the imperialist camp led by the United States and the Soviet-led camp. The latter camp represents peace, progress and socialism. Western Europe is viewed in this context by the PCF as an instrument of the capitalist United States in order to assert their dominant role in the Western camp. The PCF therefore rejects the community on two bases: (1) any bloc inside the West is, by nature, subservient to the USA and (2) such a bloc is fundamentally opposed to "la patrie du socialisme."

Being pro-Soviet, the PCF does not, however, advocate an alignment of France with the Warsaw Pact, which would be equal to committing political suicide in the France of today. Rather, it relies on a strong nationalism in opposition to Europe or to any other bloc. This nationalism finds suitable expression in an atmosphere of deep opposition to any kind of supranational Europe.<sup>264</sup>

The second argument in the debate for or against Europe is the idea that a supranational Europe is an appropriate institutional tool for the political and social struggles of communist parties. This is opposed by the idea that Europe is an institution

<sup>262</sup> Ramon Tamames, *Mundo Obrero*, Sept. 29, 1977.

<sup>263</sup> Manuel Azcarate, "The Present State of Eurocommunism", in *In Search of Eurocommunism*, Richard Kindersley, ed. (London, Macmillan, 1981), p. 34. See also Berlinguer, at the 1976 Berlin Conference, outlining the pan-European strategy of the PCI, in *The Italian Communists Speak For Themselves*, Don Sassoon, ed. (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1978), p. 79, and the thesis on international politics adopted by the PCE Tenth Congress (July 31, 1981).

<sup>264</sup> For the PCF, France and not Europe is the best suited unit to serve the requirements of a world balance of power. For example, G. Marchais states in his report to the 24th Congress of his party: "Il y aura bientôt deux ans 'au nom du réalisme' c'est à dire en prenant en compte l'influence réelle et potentielle de la France, je posais cette question: 'qui peut aujourd'hui mieux que la France jouer un rôle dans l'acheminement vers un nouvel ordre économique et politique international?'" Georges Marchais, report to the 24th Congress of the PCF, unpublished manuscript.



serving the interests of the "capitalists". Not surprisingly, the PCE and PCI developed the former and the PCF the latter.

The PCE "considers that... the workers and people of Western Europe have many common problems (crisis agriculture, industrial reconversion, energy, defence, terrorism) which cannot be solved within the limits of any country."<sup>265</sup> The PCI holds the same attitude. It favours European integration on a social and economical basis and constructive cooperation in it: "The Italian communists declare their readiness to participate in common European Community austerity programs... and to support fundamental reforms aimed, for example, at an increase in the productivity of labour, greater mobility of the work force, and lower consumption in favour of investment."<sup>266</sup> Europe is considered by the PCE and the PCI as a suitable institution for the defense of democracy and the overcoming of economic difficulties.

The PCI has developed a network of relations with other parties of the European Left.<sup>267</sup> They fully participate in forum discussions, and conferences with socialist parties and labour movements in member states, and they advocate a more integrated Europe. During the first popular election campaign to the European Parliament (1979), they strongly favored a pro-European integrationist position.<sup>268</sup> Once again, the PCE has on this matter the same point of view. The PCE, for example, devoted much attention to what it calls: "the relations and the unity of action between communist and socialist" – an integral part of its European strategy.<sup>269</sup>

By contrast, the PCF has a definite "negative" attitude toward the community. It does not believe in a Europe of people, it correlatively opposes any European Community austerity programs and does not develop the same contacts with other forces of the European Left. This negative and contrasting attitude prevented the PCF from agreeing with the PCI on a minimum common platform for the 1979 elections to the European

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<sup>265</sup> Tesis aprobadas en el X congreso del PCE, p. 5, unpublished manuscript translated by the author.

<sup>266</sup> Heinz Timmermann, "The Eurocommunists and the West", Problems of Communism, May–June 1979, p.36.

<sup>267</sup> See Giovanni Russo, "The Italian Communist Party" in Euro-communism. Myth or Reality, Paolo Filo Della Torre, Edward Mortimer and Jonathan Story, eds., p. 92.

<sup>268</sup> On the relations between the PCI and the other forces of the left within Europe, see Annie Kriegel, "Socialisme Européen" in Projet, June, 1980, no. 146, p. 703; Geoffrey Pridham, "Transnational Party Group in the European Parliament," in Journal of Common Market Studies, June, 1975; Karel van Miert, "L'Evolution au sein et autour de l'Internationale Socialiste" in Socialisme, 137, October, 1976.

<sup>269</sup> Tesis aprobadas en el X congreso del PCE, p. 6.





Parliament.

The PCF's strategy regarding the European institutions is to form a veto group to any progress in European integration with other anti-European political forces.<sup>270</sup> The party developed close ties with the Gaullists on the question of a supranational Europe on the basis of their common nationalism.<sup>271</sup> It also collaborates politically with the anti-European Greek Left – the Moscow oriented Communist Party of Greece – Exterior (KKE Exterior) and the Pasok of Andreas Papandreou. For example, in January 1979, Georges Marchais signed a joint communique with the two Greek parties. This communique strongly opposed the Greek entry into the Community.<sup>272</sup>

Beyond its nationalist stances, the PCF voices its opposition to Europe on social and economical grounds. For it, the Communities are essentially an instrument of monopoly and multinational capital. The common market is viewed by it as "la petite Europe capitaliste, l'Europe des trusts, des monopoles."<sup>273</sup> For the PCF, capitalists have made Europe in order to serve their aim of exploitation. By abolishing the boundaries between member-states, the capitalists can reach a greater market while less political control is imposed upon them. Note that the PCI and PCE do not see the economic consequences of multinational corporations and more generally, of the mobility of capital, so negatively. Heinz Timmermann, a German specialist of Western European Communist parties, notes:

Unlike its French counterpart, the PCI accepts the idea that Italy should participate in the existing international divisions of labour....The PCI and the PCE have abandoned their former moralizing and demonizing accusations against the multinational corporations and have come to the conclusion that the multinationals can indeed contribute to economic development and provide jobs.<sup>274</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the PCF opposed the entry of Greece into the Communities. In addition, the PCF was and still is against the admission of Spain and Portugal to these institutions. One basis of its opposition resides in the party's concern over the competitiveness of French southern agriculture based mainly on fruit and vinicultural products. The question regarding the entry of Spain, Portugal and Greece into the

<sup>270</sup> See Robert Lowenthal, "Eurocommunism 1978: Moscow and the Eurocommunists," Problems of Communism, July–August 1978, p. 40.

<sup>271</sup> See Donald L.M. Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France, p. 57.

<sup>272</sup> L'Humanité, January 22, 1979.

<sup>273</sup> Marc Riglet, "La politique étrangère du PCF" in Projet, July, 1978, no. 127, p. 850.

<sup>274</sup> Heinz Timmermann, "The Eurocommunist and the West", Problems of Communism, May–June, 1979, p. 45.



Community is a major issue in the regional politics of the Languedoc-Roussillon area because of the importance of wine and fruit production for this region's economy. The Languedoc-Roussillon is a traditional PCF electoral stronghold. This also explains the PCF opposition to the Communities. It is symptomatic to note that Pierre Maffre Bauge, an otherwise apolitical leading figure "des vignerons du Midi", has been elected on the PCF slate to the European Parliament (1979).

But the PCF also opposes the extension of the Community toward the South on another basis. It fears that the entry of Spain, Portugal and Greece would mean a bigger proportional representation for the Socialist parties within the European Left. In each of the three countries, a socialist party electorally outweighs the communist party. For the PCF, the relative weight of the socialist parties is a direct threat of marginalization of the communist forces within the European Left.

The Italian and Spanish communist parties hold an opposite position with regard to the admission of Spain and Portugal into the Community. It has been seen that the PCE favours the entry of its country within the European Community. In 1978, Manuel Azcarate declared in the PCI periodical Rinascita that he saw the proposed extension of the Communities as essentially beneficial for the Left within Europe. For him, the entry of Spain, Portugal and Greece meant a change toward a more Leftist European Community.<sup>275</sup> Azcarate's view is shared by the PCI's leaders. They would also favour the entry of the Southern European countries on the basis that their admission would recenter Europe sociologically toward a more Mediterranean perspective. Correlatively, the PCI leaders also have in mind the fact that the Community linkage between Spain and Portugal and the Northern European democracies is an excellent factor for a "democratic stability" of the region. The Northern European nations could play a big role in preventing the Southern ones from going back to dictatorship. One must keep in mind that the 'democratic' character of a country has always been a prerequisite for admission to the Communities.<sup>276</sup> Finally, the PCI leaders do not have the PCF's economic concern regarding the extension of the Community even though the Italian electorate has the same, if not more, reasons to fear a strong competition of Spanish, Greek and Portuguese agricultural producers.

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<sup>275</sup> Rinascita, Nov. 24, 1978.

<sup>276</sup> See Treaty of Rome.





## C. Conclusion

In order to introduce some elements of comparison, an evaluation based on three criteria will be used to judge the autonomy of the parties. These criteria are the time framework, the policy stakes and the manner in which each national party reacts to Eastern Bloc cues. The time framework is the length of time a party has kept its actual political line with the Soviet Union. The longer the actual line has been pursued, the more its reliability as a sign of autonomy or dependence. The policy stakes are evaluated by the importance given to any event in terms of internal policy of each communist party. By looking at the manner of the reaction to Eastern Bloc cues, the writer tried to determine how the parties appraise the Eastern Bloc political system and position themselves vis-a-vis what is going on there. The power bloc led by their "Mother" party, the CPSU, is naturally of special concern to them.

The PCF throughout its history has shown viewpoints traditional for any communist party except during 1968 to 1978. With the exception of those years, the PCF has been highly dependent. Soviet relations are fundamental for the PCF. The Polish question is an example of very high policy stakes. It shook the PCF both internally and externally. The appraisal of the Soviet Union by the PCF and its criticism of those who do not share its view (and are therefore called anti-Soviet) is absolute. The PCF has a polarized view of the world. By essence, it stands on one side, the socialist side, and violently opposes the other, the capitalist side.

In foreign policy, the PCF is also highly nationalist. France is the official or public ultimate aim of its foreign policy. The party therefore condemns as contrary to Frenchmen's interests any political association of France with any country or bloc.

Although the Third Communist International is dead, although the PCF does not publicly always stand with Moscow and although the party strongly stands for nationalism, the French Communists criticize every aspect of Western nations' foreign policy. Yet, the independence of France, which the PCF is struggling for, totally fits the Soviet Union's foreign policy and constitutes an undermining of the Western alliance. Therefore, the author concludes that the PCF foreign policy does not constitute originality. The PCF,



willingly or not, still remains, in foreign policy, as an instrument of the Soviets.

The PCE refuses to see the world as polarized and rejects both the Washington and the Moscow models. In this regard, the PCE is therefore highly independent from Moscow. The PCE position has progressively developed since Carrillo became General Secretary. According to the time parameter, the PCE independence is also well established. The removal of Carrillo by Iglesias in November 1982 did not cause any change in this regard.

Regarding the policy stakes, one may say that the question of the relations between the USSR and the PCE is in the forefront of questions facing the PCE and therefore of the entire Spanish political scene. The PCE stands for liberal democracy. Therefore, it is directly opposed to the Soviet Union and its manner of handling this opposition has been frontal, to say the least.

Conversely, the PCE strongly stands for a united Europe which could overcome the world polarity and develop its own type of socialism. The PCE has broken its ties with the Soviet Union sufficiently to develop autonomous stances for a new international world order, although its criticisms of NATO and of the American foreign policy have not diminished with time. The PCE's anti-imperialist stances do not represent an alignment on similar positions of the Soviet Union. These stances result from the traditional communist and socialist opposition to any kind of neo-colonialism in the Third World. It should be noted that, before coming to power, the French PS also stood, on the same basis, in favour of all the national movements in the Western World.

The PCI was the first of the three parties to follow an independent road from Moscow. It has kept this path until now. The political stakes of its relations with Moscow are not as central as they are for the PCE and the PCF. But the debate on civil liberties and pluralism is as central for it as it is for the others. Unlike the PCE, the PCI has expressed its criticisms to the Soviets in a very diplomatic way. On this basis, the difference of independence between those two parties is very obvious. But there is also another one.

The PCI's acceptance of NATO is relatively new and questionable. Although the time parameter allows us to affirm the PCI's sincere and stable support for the EEC, it does not allow us to assert its complete adhesion to the West. The PCI's room of manoeuvre is very limited. In order to attain a dominant position within the Italian society,





the PCI must be pragmatic. In Italian foreign policy, that means accepting the European Community and NATO. But such a commitment does not necessarily result from an internal firm standpoint for the West. The PCI is driven to that kind of moderate foreign policy because of its goal of gaining a hegemonic position in Italy. This goal prevents the conclusion that the PCI definitely intends to align itself to the West.

In summary of this conclusion, one may say that the three parties have taken independent paths from Moscow in foreign policy. The PCI and the PCE have stood firmly for a strong supranational Europe. The three parties have declared that their communism is nationalist. The PCI even has accepted NATO. However, it must be recognized that the PCI and the PCF have kept very "familiar" relations with Moscow and that the three parties consistently have stood for revolution in the Third World.



## V. Conclusion

This thesis attempts to answer the two following questions: Is there room for Eurocommunism as a communism with a human face? And, can this socialism be different from social democracy?

In order to answer the first question, the PCI, PCE and PCF's independent paths from Moscow have been analyzed in terms of their duration and their nature. The present conclusion will first present the time parameter and then analyze how far the three parties have diverged from the Soviet model.

The popular front' experiences of the PCI and PCE cannot be interpreted as manifestations of independence from Moscow. Stalin's figure was still considered as the reference of all the Communists and the example of the "pays du socialisme incarné" could not be questioned at that time. The parties subordinated their foreign policy to that of the Soviet Union. During the popular fronts, the Communists defended the new idea of alliances with the other popular forces, but the popular fronts were far from developing other differences from the Soviet model. For example, the dictatorship of the proletariat or the necessity for every party to obey the orders of the communist international were not questioned.

Independent paths from Moscow were developed only after World War II, first by the PCI and then by the PCE. The PCI strongly stood for a nationalist communism. It heavily relied on Gramsci. In the late forties, Togliatti already accepted what he called progressive democracy – a transitional parliamentary stage to revolution. The PCI progressively abandoned the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and adopted a positive attitude vis-à-vis the Italian democracy. The PCE followed this example in the sixties. From 1968 on, the PCF adopted the same patterns. Therefore, according to the time framework, independent paths from Moscow had been developed only in the last thirty-five years, the PCI being in the forefront of the change.

With regard to the nature of their independent paths, the three parties have accepted political pluralism in their national political scene, while sticking to internal democratic centralism. The three, however, diverge in their applications of democratic





centralism. Here, the PCE is in the forefront of change with its acceptance of free discussion within the party and with the procedure it has adopted to elect its "cadres", although until November, 1982, its General Secretary had not been contested for twenty years. The PCI strongly applies democratic centralism while the PCF's search for unity does not allow much internal discussion and uses strong "filters" in the appointment of its "cadres".

With regard to foreign policy, the PCE is the most independent from Moscow and the PCF the least. Both the PCI and the PCE develop foreign policies independent from the military blocs although, in matters regarding the Third World, they adopt Soviet stances.

In general, the PCE has developed the most independent path from Moscow and its model of socialism. The PCI as well may be considered as developing a new kind of communism. The PCF's transformations, although firmly nationalist, are not sufficient to permit this conclusion.

But how is one to evaluate the Eurocommunist movement? The socialist movement at the time of the Second International was overwhelmingly Marxist in the sense that the socialists stood for a revolution aiming at the destruction of the capitalist system. The communist parties of Western Europe reaffirmed, at the time of their creation, this Marxist aim. For them, it has not changed. Gramsci, Togliatti, Carrillo and others who in regard to doctrine have intended to create a new socialism or a 'third way', never modified the marxist tenet of revolution. The debate between Communists and Social Democrats is a proof of this affirmation. In this debate, the former, including the Eurocommunists, always have defined themselves as revolutionary in opposition to the latter.

What has changed over time between Moscow, and the Western European communist parties studied here, is the strategy to reach revolution. Therefore, it is at level of strategy that the Eurocommunist movement should be analyzed. In other words, the Eurocommunists still remain revolutionary in the Marxist sense. They only have developed a new strategy to reach this goal.

The grounds for the development of the three parties' strategies must be sought in their history. At their creation, the PCI, PCE, and PCF each were of the bolshevik type of party. There was also a strong commitment within all the new parties to the Third Communist International. It is the writer's contention that different national evolutions of



the members of the International as well as doctrinal readjustment to these evolutions progressively weakened the links between each of the parties and between Moscow and each of them.

The fascist experience and World War II pushed the PCI to accept liberal democracy. In the fight against Mussolini and Hitler, the PCI joined the efforts of the other 'democratic' forces and temporarily put the defence of democracy and national independence ahead of revolution and international socialism. The course of events led the PCI toward embracing liberal democracy. Gramsci and Togliatti brought the doctrinal legitimization for such a stance without giving up the revolutionary stance.

In France, there was far less opposition to fascism before World War II. Before World War II, the PCF's motive in joining the popular front was primarily anti-fascist, but there was also an important undercurrent of nationalist feeling. This may explain the nationalist stance taken by the PCF, while the difference of national political climate may be an explanation of why the PCI developed further autonomous paths.

In Spain, despite of what Carrillo argues, there is no direct link between the Spanish popular front experience and Eurocommunism. It appears rather that the PCE Eurocommunist stance was intended to break with the past and to present a new image of the party, which is a liberal democratic image. In the seventies, the PCI was gaining popularity and Eurocommunism was very fashionable. Santiago Carrillo decided to lead the PCE along the PCI's path.

Despite the Eurocommunists' frequent references to Gramsci, one may also question the link between Gramsci and the Eurocommunist movement. The PCI and the PCE have argued that Gramsci is truly Eurocommunist. It is obvious that Gramsci doctrinally gave foundation to a new kind of communism. Gramsci developed the notion of the necessity for the party to acquire an hegemonic position over civil society prior to revolution and insisted on the national character of the revolution. In this regard, Gramsci was the first Eurocommunist. Some have argued that Gramsci was a proponent of liberal democracy. But many doubts must be expressed here. It is difficult to believe that, given the development of the communist movement in the thirties, Gramsci would not have insisted more on liberal democracy if he had really stood for it.





But the respect for liberal democracy can be simply a means for the Communists of Western Europe to reach hegemony over civil society prior to revolution. The parties will easily forget their commitment for liberal democracy when the time of revolution will have come. If no further explanation is given of the type of revolution the Eurocommunists would like to make, the preceding interpretation is the only acceptable interpretation. This analysis suggests, nevertheless, that especially in the case of the PCE, the change of tactic to reach revolution can be of such degree that the strategy of accepting liberal democracy can take precedence over the revolutionary goal. In this case, the party can be considered as having abandoned the need of a revolutionary clash with capitalism and having become social democrat, although it still claims to be revolutionary. Revolution could then simply mean important social and economic transformations within the capitalist system. The parties would advocate approximately what some leftist currents within European socialist parties like the French Ceres and the Left of the British Labour party advocate now.

However, one can only conclude by expressing doubts on the possibility of Eurocommunism as the revolutionary communist alternative to Russian communism. Gramsci, Togliatti and Carrillo maintain, contrary to the Social Democrats, that a break with capitalism is necessary and at the same time advocate political pluralism before reaching hegemony. The three are very vague on the type of regime they want to establish once the hegemonic position of their party over civil society is obtained. The evolution of the PCI and the PCE clearly shows the internal opposition between ranks that are dogmatic, revolutionary, internationalist, pro-Soviet and those that are liberal democratic, revisionist, accommodating. The parties cannot present the image of "liberal revolutionary" which the Eurocommunists claim for them, because both from the doctrinal and the practical point of view, the two parties cannot define a third way between Stalinism and social democracy. The basic assumption that Eurocommunism can make revolution while respecting political pluralism must be rejected. Beyond the transitional period to revolution, the parties will be either social democratic or 'Bolshevik'. They will either accept the political system and reform it or attempt to transform it violently. There is no foundation in this philosophy or in the practice of Eurocommunist parties for a revolution from within in a communist way.



This last conclusion is shared by some scholars who have approached the question in a political science way and have posed doctrinal questions. Some argue that Eurocommunism is another form of bolshevism and that there is no doctrinal foundation for saying that the parties could become social democratic. Such is the case of Annie Kriegel and Roy Godson.<sup>277</sup> Others consider that a switch from bolshevism to social democracy is possible; this is the case of Rudolf Tokes.<sup>278</sup> Some other scholars do not see the incompatibility between revolutionary communism and liberal democracy. They simply consider that the parties have more or less democratized. These authors show this democratization in a "non-scientific" (less rigorous) approach. This is, for example, the case with Arrigo Levi or Jonathan Story.<sup>279</sup>

This study could have been more rigorous by the use of hypothesis testing or models. But as has been stated all along in this thesis, this was not necessary for the handling of the subject. Because of the doctrinal impossibility of combining democratic centralism, revolution and liberal democracy, any analysis of the democratization of the parties is conditioned by the overriding importance of doctrine. This study has shown that whatever the liberalization of the parties, any democratization was conditional on doctrine and thus annihilated by the keeping of democratic centralism and of revolution as the path to socialism. Methodologically, "l'esprit de finesse" allows us to draw this conclusion. It would hardly have been possible to reach it by looking at the subject only using the "esprit de géométrie" as it has been used in the literature.

Far be it from the writer to pretend to have solved any problem; this study is a mere presentation of doctrinal positions in their complex and changing character. Substantial aspects of the subject have been brought to light by "esprit de finesse" and discussed accordingly. These aspects are Gramsci's philosophy, the democratization of the parties vis-à-vis both their bolshevik origin and their theoretical contradiction, and the impossibility of adapting revolutionary Marxism to Western liberal democracy.

This study has examined changes in the three parties in the last half century, and particularly since 1945. It has shown the overriding importance of doctrine over

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<sup>277</sup> Annie Kriegel, Eurocommunism: A New Kind of Communism, p.114. Roy Godson, Eurocommunism, p.124.

<sup>278</sup> Rudolf Tokes, Eurocommunism and Detente, (New York, New York University Press, 1978), p.65.

<sup>279</sup> Arrigo Levi, "Eurocommunism, Myth or Reality," p.30; Jonathan Story, "The Spanish Communist Party," p.185.





liberalization, in that democratic centralism and the revolutionary prospect have undergone important changes, if at all, only in the PCE; and the PCE has interacted legally with other parties only since 1977.

The conclusion was not anticipated. It is the result of a lack of satisfactory answers by the Eurocommunists to key questions on democratization and liberalization of their parties. The present rather simple conclusion was possible because scholars of the subject have not been interested in the question as it is posed here. Nevertheless, it is hoped that scholars, by using both "esprit de finesse" and "esprit de géométrie", will recognize the need to see doctrine as a superstructure overriding the elements of liberalization and that this will enable them to discuss political consequences in a realistic framework. It is in this sense that this study is a preliminary step to the comprehension of what the existence of Eurocommunist parties means for Western Europe.

Further questions will have to be raised and answered. One may ask, for example, for how long can both parties keep their two goals of exercising hegemony over civil society and respecting liberal democracy? In the event of a communist hegemony, will the parties continue to develop independent paths from Moscow? If so, is the result of such a hegemony likely to differ greatly from the Russian hegemony? What would be the consequences of a Eurocommunist hegemony on liberal capitalism and what would be its consequences for the relations between the two superpowers?



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